

# **NEGOTIATION:**

## Methodology and training

Louise Nieuwmeijer

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Human Sciences Research Council

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CHSRC 1988

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To my husband Johan, for teaching me the rudimentaries of integrative negotiation, and Tiina, our greatest mutual gain.

The viewpoints in this book are those of the author  
and not necessarily those of the HSRC.

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# Preface

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Negotiation is a process through which two or more parties communicate with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests. It occurs in fields as diverse as labour relations, international conflicts, political and constitutional issues, socio-economic development and personal relations.

*Negotiation: Methodology and training* started as a literature review identifying research areas to be investigated by the Programme on Negotiation of the Institute for Communication Research (Human Sciences Research Council). The need for a general overview of negotiation methodology (theory and research methods) became apparent from the demand for the review from students, instructors and practitioners. It was therefore decided to publish the review as a book and to add a chapter on training.

The purpose of the book is to provide a useful overview of negotiation theory, research and training. It covers the work of practitioners and researchers from many disciplines. It also includes references to research done by directly observing real (as opposed to simulated) intercultural negotiations in Southern Africa.

The book surveys the nature and significance of negotiation and discusses the latest thinking on the subject. Concepts like negotiation, collective bargaining, mediation, persuasion, arbitration and lobbying are defined.

The most prominent theoretical approaches and the models that developed from these approaches are discussed and classified in terms of their underlying structure. In addition the strong points and limitations of the models are compared. The methods used to study negotiation and the type and value of knowledge resulting from the various methods are covered. Elements such as power, credibility, trust, negotiator personality, experience and perception — all of which play a role in negotiation — are discussed. The book concludes with an evaluation of well-known training materials and courses. The need to base training courses on research is stressed, and areas that still require attention are pointed out.

Louise Nieuwmeijer January 1988

# 1

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## **Introduction: The nature and significance of negotiation**

### **THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION**

Negotiation is a fact of life; just as we as humans cannot exist without communicating, so we can barely exist without negotiating.

Negotiation is a basic way of getting what one party wants from another, it is an exchange of information through communication. The information exchanged is formulated as strategies and techniques. These strategies and techniques originate from the negotiation relationship between the parties, and they also serve to continue or discontinue the relationship. The purpose of this communication exchange is to reach agreement between parties who have certain things in common while disagreeing on others.

### **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGOTIATION**

No South African (and certainly no-one aware of the international situation) needs be convinced of the significance of negotiation today. As the escalation of conflict becomes evident in the world

– in diverse fields such as labour-management, international affairs, business and personal relationships – the significance of negotiations and the need to negotiate increase.

## THE STATE OF NEGOTIATION KNOWLEDGE

In spite of the enormous developments in communication technology and the management sciences, parties are still negotiating in much the same way as in the days of yore. Compare the negotiation between the following: Abraham and God on the destruction of Sodom and Gomorra as chronicled in Genesis 18; Thucydides' account of Pericles' negotiation with the Spartans; De Callières's notes on Cardinal d'Ossat's negotiations in France in 1716; Ghandi's negotiations on the trusteeship of India; the negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia on Trieste in 1954; the numerous negotiations during the last two decades on Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the Middle East; the arms race between America and Russia; the transfer of land to National States in Southern Africa. The question is, however, whether the knowledge of negotiation has increased with the importance of the phenomenon. Do we have a better understanding of the negotiating process today?

Iklés's (1964) pretheoretical pioneering work, *How nations negotiate*, and Sawyer and Guetzgow's (1965) *Bargaining and negotiation in international relations*, were the first of many publications and research articles that today form part of the knowledge which is available on negotiation. Basic sources (for example Rubin and Brown's (1975) *Social Psychology of negotiation and bargaining*); numerous articles in journals of various disciplines (*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Communication*, *Journal of Applied Psychology*); and various recent books such as Raiffa's (1982) *The art and science of negotiation*, Bazerman and Lewicki's (1983) *Negotiation in organizations*, and Pruitt's (1981) *Negotiation behavior* are evidence of the advancement in the negotiation field since the appearance of the pioneering works.

The significance and establishment of the negotiation field is underlined by the appearance of scientific journals concentrating

exclusively on negotiation, (for example *The Winning Negotiator* and *Harvard Negotiation Journal*, since April 1984 published under the auspices of the *Harvard Program on Negotiation*). This programme entails the training, research co-ordination and advancement of publications on negotiation by prominent academics and researchers like Professors Jeffrey Rubin, Roger Fischer, Dean Pruitt and Howard Raiffa.

There has not only been an increase in negotiation publications, but also in the number of disciplines studying it. Negotiation is being studied by social scientists from diverse fields such as management sciences, industrial psychology, political science, sociology, and group and organisational communications.

In 1983 the Human Sciences Research Council initiated a research programme on negotiation at the Institute of Communication Research, as a result of a need for better understanding of this process in our complex South African society. The purpose of this programme is to identify research problems in negotiation, to systematise and extend knowledge on the subject (both the theory and research methods) and to help implement this knowledge in practice. This is done by undertaking self-initiated projects, and projects commissioned by, and in conjunction with, other organisations (including overseas researchers).

In spite of the advance in the negotiation field and a realisation of the significance of negotiation as a conflict management process, Gulliver (1979:xiv) describes the state of negotiation knowledge as being in a formative stage, characterised by tentative conceptualising and hypothesising, with a small amount of targeted accumulated data and analysis. Pruitt (1986:237) goes as far as to compare the scientific nature of negotiation knowledge (the extent to which the theory has been tested in reality) with the state of the knowledge of medicine during the middle ages. This is evident from the following: “. . . the fields of negotiation and mediation subsist largely on a diet of maxims-prescriptive rules of thumb, succinct statements about what to do and not to do.” The knowledge of negotiation is, therefore, not only unorganised, but largely untested in practice.

Weiss-Wik (1983) reinforces Pruitt's statement in his criticism of six prominent American negotiation training programmes. He observes that these courses are not based on available research, but on what Pruitt (1986) calls maxims, or subjective and superficial observations.

There certainly is a need for the systematisation and critique of the existing information on negotiation; clear and unambiguous definitions of relevant concepts; the testing of these concepts in practice, and the use of these results as the basis of courses on negotiation.

## **THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK**

Based on the needs in the negotiation field, the purpose of this book is to—

- clearly define negotiation concepts,
- systematise existing models and theories on negotiation,
- critique existing research methods employed in the negotiation field,
- give a short overview of elements that influence the negotiating process,
- abstract the most important negotiating skills covered by training programmes, and
- identify negotiation areas that still need attention.

## **ORGANISATION OF THE TEXT**

In Chapter two the concepts relevant to negotiation will be defined and discussed; in Chapter three existing models and theories of negotiation will be systematised and reviewed; existing research methods will be critiqued in Chapter four; a discussion of elements that influence the negotiation process is covered in Chapter five; in Chapter six the work is concluded with a

summary of the most important negotiating skills covered in negotiation training literature, and courses and areas that still need attention in the negotiation field are discussed.



# 2

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## Concept definitions

The clear and unambiguous definition of concepts relevant to the negotiation field, is one of the needs as identified in Chapter one. One concept often constitutes more than one meaning, while various concepts are often defined in the same way.

### NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING

The greatest confusion results from the differences in meaning between the concepts *negotiation* and *bargaining*. The aim of this chapter is to define these and other relevant concepts to enable the reader to understand negotiation as a process.

Three categories of negotiation and bargaining are defined in the literature:

- Negotiation as the complete negotiating process (from when the parties decide to negotiate over a conflicting issue until the final decision is implemented or the negotiation is broken off, while bargaining is defined as the face-to-face communication process that takes place within the broader negotiation process.

- Negotiation as co-operative and bargaining as competitive interaction.
- The use of only the negotiating or bargaining concept, or the interchange of both concepts to describe the whole negotiation process.

The last of these categories of definitions is supported by a dictionary definition.

According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, bargaining is “an agreement on terms of give and take; come to terms . . .” Negotiation is defined as: “confer with another with view to compromise or agreement; arrange; bring about...” According to these definitions, both negotiation and bargaining aim to reach an agreement or compromise through the process of give and take.

The last category, in which negotiation and bargaining are used interchangeably, will be the essence of this study. To prevent misunderstanding, only the term negotiation will be used. Negotiation is therefore seen in this study as the complete process of planning, face-to-face communication and the implementation of an agreement.

The nature of the negotiation process may very well vary, depending on the strategy followed. If an integrated approach is taken, both parties attempt to achieve the greatest gain, with the smallest possible loss for the other party by means of co-operation. Distributive negotiation entails the greatest gain for a party without considering the position of the other, and is achieved through competition. In practice, negotiation is usually of a mixed-motive nature – in other words, both co-operative and competitive interaction take place. Notwithstanding the nature of the interaction, all action taking place during the process is seen as negotiation.

Numerous definitions of negotiation, describing the number of participants involved, the nature of the interaction that takes place, the elements of the process, and various other issues concerning negotiation, are found in various publications

(Atkinson 1980:25; Bazerman, Lewicki 1983:14; Donohue, Diez, Hamilton 1984:403; Fowler, Fowler 1964:807; Gulliver 1979:xiii; Marais 1979:125; Pruitt 1981:1; Putnam 1985a:1; Rubin, Brown 1975:2; Sawyer, Guetzkow 1965:466; Zartman, Berman 1982:1). These definitions have the following in common:

- negotiation is a process (transactional, exchange, or problem solving)
- where two or more parties (individuals and groups) that have a direct stake in the issues under discussion
- strive through the exchange and structuring of information
- to come to an effective behaviour binding agreement
- on a common problem or conflict that exists between them.

In terms of these underlying, factors common to the definitions of negotiation, negotiation can be defined as–

*A process through which two parties with a vested interest in the issues at stake, strive to reach a mutual behaviour binding agreement through the exchange of structured information that becomes available through the communication relationship.*

## **COLLECTIVE BARGAINING**

Collective bargaining, or rather collective negotiation, is a negotiation process between two or more parties consisting of *groups of people* acting collectively. The purpose is therefore to come to an agreement on issues that concern the group. Collective negotiation can also be undertaken by agents or representatives on behalf of the group, and moreover, these agents need not be members of the groups concerned. This form of negotiation is usually found in labour relations (Piron 1978).

## **PERSUASION**

Persuasion is a communication process that results in a change of attitude or behaviour. Bostrom (1983:11) expands on this

description of persuasion in the following way: “Persuasion is a communicative behavior that has as its purpose the changing, modification, or shaping of the responses (attitudes or behavior) of the receivers.” An important aspect of persuasion is behavioural change. Persuasion, however, should be distinguished from intimidation or force, where the behavioural change is not by choice.

Persuasion is a key component of negotiation. Bostrom (1983:231) states that “. . . the *really* persuasive task is to get individuals to bargain at all.” Persuasion is not only found in the face-to-face phase of negotiation, but also in the important pre-negotiation phase.

## **MEDIATION**

Mediation is the process through which agreements are reached with the aid of a neutral third party or “helper” (Susskind, Ozawa 1983). The third party should have no decision making power and have no vested interest in either of the parties. The mediator acts mainly as a communication and problem-solving catalyst, or as an agent to maximise the exploration and generation of alternatives; while the responsibility for the final agreement rests with the conflicting parties.

In South Africa, the appointment and function of a mediator in labour conflicts is controlled by Section 44 of the Labour Relations Act of 1981.

## **ARBITRATION**

Arbitration is also based on the intervention by a third party in an attempt to reach an agreement, but the final decision lies with the arbitrator. The parties no longer have the right to conclude an agreement. Each presents his case to the arbitrator, who takes the facts into consideration in forming his verdict. The arbitrator’s decision is usually binding (Piron 1982:91). For further reading on the role of the arbitrator and how it differs from that of the mediator, refer to Susskind (Susskind, Bazerman 1985).

## **LOBBYING**

Lobbying is mainly found in national and international negotiations, where one party tries to pressurise the other, directly or indirectly through a third party, to accept their point of view or objective. Lobbying includes influencing a person or persons influential enough to advance your issue or viewpoint (Peters 1983).

As outlined earlier, attention will be focused on the process of negotiation – defined in this chapter – and not on persuasion, arbitration, mediation, or lobbying.



# 3

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## Theories and models of negotiation

There is hardly a theoretical perspective in the whole spectrum – ranging from the most mechanistic to the most humanistic approach – that has not been used in negotiation research where a theoretical approach has been used at all. These diverse approaches contribute to the richness of the available knowledge on negotiation, but they have also led to a great deal of confusion. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts that were utilised in research are diverse, and the meanings attributed to the concepts vary greatly. The disparity between the theoretical paradigms involved also makes integration of available knowledge in the particular field difficult, if not impossible.

Instead of adding to the confusion in the negotiation field by proposing yet another theoretical perspective to those already used, this chapter gives a short overview of the major existing theoretical approaches in negotiation research. The models that have developed from these theoretical approaches will be classified and compared in terms of their strengths and weaknesses in representing negotiation as dynamic human behaviour.

## THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The most prominent theoretical approaches used in negotiation studies are–

- the game theory approach,
- the bilateral monopolistic theory approach
- different theories of a non-mathematical (more verbal) nature.

The latter theoretical approach is called verbal theories, for lack of a better collective term.

### The game theory approach

The game theories developed from the classical work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), *Theory of games and economic behavior*. This approach has been used by many researchers but expanded mainly by Rapoport (1964) and his associates (1976, 1984).

As a theoretical approach to the study of negotiation as complex, dynamic human behaviour, this approach has more limitations than advantages. Game theorists focus on fixed-sum dilemmas, where there are only winners and losers. In practice, this is hardly ever the case as there are usually shared gains and losses (Walton, McKersie 1965). Secondly, communication in the negotiation process often changes the participant's objectives, preferences and expectations. As a static model, the game theory does not allow for such changes, especially where objectives are set in advance. Thirdly, the game theory oversimplifies the negotiation interaction of the participants on the basis of its underlying assumptions that there are only a set number of participants, issues and courses of action available, and that participants are always rational in their actions (see Putnam 1985:3 for a detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions of the game theory approach).

The limitations discussed here prohibit the transfer of the research findings (mostly done under simulated or laboratory situations) for application in practice (Kohan 1980).

### **The bilateral monopolistic theory approach**

The bilateral monopolistic theorists address themselves to real negotiation problems, but their research designs do not reflect this advance in their knowledge. Their concepts can only be put into operation with difficulty, or not at all, and many variables that are present and fluctuate in practice, have been omitted or strictly controlled in research of this nature. Strauss's (1977:331) statement supports this: "Bargaining theory made little allowance for such complexities as mixed-motive situations, past history and socio-economic environment, intra-organisational bargaining, or the institutional needs of the parties."

### **Verbal or non-mathematical theory approach**

The verbal type theory approach includes research based on various theoretical perspectives such as transactional analysis, exchange theory, systems theory, and is combined with a wide variety of research methods such as case studies, historical analysis and interviews with negotiators.

These studies have contributed greatly to the understanding of negotiation, by diverting from the previous types of theories in reaction to the deductive methodology that was employed. Researchers using this approach do not favour the limiting Quantitative techniques of the game theory and usually concentrate on in-depth discussions of a few (or a single) case studies. Knowledge gained by such an approach brought a new, in-depth dimension to the existing knowledge of negotiation. The results obtained by these studies, however, cannot be generalized in all negotiation situations, as there are no standards, measures, or observation guidelines that can be compared, and the research designs (if any) do not allow for

external validation. The research available within this grouping of research approaches, therefore, does not at present contribute to systematic theory development in the negotiation field (Kohan 1980, Bercovitch 1983).

### **Future theoretical developments**

None of the available research in these theoretical approaches explains negotiation as a complex and dynamic process of human behaviour. It has, however, led to the development of various models of negotiation. By systematising and comparing the underlying structures, strengths, and limitations of these negotiation models, it is possible to establish guidelines for a productive model that can represent negotiation in a more realistic and productive way.

Gulliver (1979) advises the use of an approach and a model that are less restrictive in terms of the negotiating process, and that make allowance for various negotiation situations and the many variables and issues that influence the process. Such an approach, and models resulting from it, should assist in the understanding of negotiation as a complete, complex process that takes place in a social and organisational context.

### **NEGOTIATION MODELS**

Negotiation models that have developed from the discussed theoretical approaches are as numerous as the theories of negotiation, if not more so. A discussion of each model will not add to a better understanding of the viewpoints covered by contributors to the field. A synopsis of existing models will be given in the form of a typology. A typology has been chosen as classification framework, since negotiation models cannot be classified in non-overlapping classes, because of their human-scientific nature.

## A typology of negotiation models

The development of a typology of negotiation models can be approached in various ways. Negotiation models can be classified as mathematical versus non-mathematical, analytical versus descriptive, or dynamic versus passive dichotomies.


Despite the fact that no generally accepted classification exists, Coddington (1968) tentatively endeavoured to establish criteria for a typology of negotiating models. Oliva and Leap (1981) elaborated on the Coddington principles and developed a promising classification system, based on the mathematical versus non-mathematical dichotomy. It has been decided to make use of this dichotomy in this study, as the nature of negotiation models can easily be distinguished on the grounds of their mathematical or non-mathematical nature.

In the mathematical negotiating models, negotiation is represented by calculating the negotiating results mathematically (Rapoport, Gyer, Gordon 1976), or by calculating the optimum point for an agreement (Susskind, Bazerman 1985). They can represent a large number of complex variables, their relation, and the analytical levels more precisely and accurately, as they do not have to make use of verbal input and can therefore be more exact. It is, nevertheless, this precision that restricts a comprehensive phenomenon such as negotiation, because the process whereby the result is derived – the negotiating phases, the relation, the elements which play a role therein and in the broader context – has not, as yet, been thoroughly investigated. The economic models, such as the usefulness or profit models that are also mainly mathematically orientated, are used in business, and their development can be ascribed to the business-world's willingness to provide money for this research.

Both the mathematical and economic type of models are classified in greater detail than the non-mathematical models. They do, however, reflect more serious defects, which make them unsuitable for describing negotiation as a complex communication process functioning within a social context. (Compare the discussion later in this chapter).

**Figure 1**

**TYPOLOGY OF NEGOTIATION MODELS**



A synopsis of existing negotiating models, classified according to mathematical or non-mathematical disposition, is shown in Figure 1. This typology of negotiating models is an adaptation and expansion of that of Coddington's (1968) and Oliva and Leap's (1981).

Models on the mathematical side of the dichotomy include economic, game theory and hybrid models. The game theory models attracted much attention in the negotiation writings of the past decade or two, resulting in their redefinition as zero-sum and variable-sum models. Typical zero-sum models are, for example, the archetype of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), while the most recent developments make provision for more than two parties, such as the variable models of Rapoport (1974), and Rapoport and Kahan (1984).


Non-mathematical models cover a broad spectrum that include process, phase, element, limitations, intervention, and hybrid-type models. Each one of these types of model has its own strengths and limitations. This will be discussed in detail later and also in Table 3.

The fundamental differences illustrated in Figure 1 and the manner in which the models can be refined can be understood only when the differences in the underlying structure of each model class have been indicated. The underlying structure of the model types will be discussed to determine their potential use in understanding negotiation.

### **The underlying structure of negotiation model classes**

The underlying structure of negotiation model classes is illustrated in Figure 2. As in Figure 2, the focus point of models such as the utility models, is the optimum agreement that can be reached between two parties. Refinement of these models will therefore be aimed at, or improve, the prediction of the optimum point of agreement – also called the “Pareto frontier”

Figure 2



(Susskind, Bazerman 1985). This type of model should be useful in the practical negotiating situation, aiding the decision of how much gain and how much loss could be allowed in the given situation. This model type is, however, of no use for understanding negotiation as a complex communication process.

The element type non-mathematical model provides the possibility of Quantifying the strength and direction of a negotiation element (for example power) as vectors. The characteristics in terms of which the model can be refined will therefore constitute its strength and direction. This type of model shows more potential than the mathematical models, but can only be used in one aspect of negotiation and not in the whole phenomenon in its social context, or in the interaction between various elements.

There is a need for a negotiation model in which the underlying structure lends itself to a representation of the whole dynamic process. The potential of each model type must therefore be examined in greater detail.

### **Contributions, limitations, language and contributors to negotiation models**

The contributions, limitations and language of each negotiation model type will – for the sake of clarity and systematic ordering – be done in Table 1. Examples of some contributors to each type will also be given.

### **CONCLUSION**

Negotiation is a *process* that proceeds in *phases* that can be identified through the interaction patterns. This process is influenced by various *elements*. An ideal model of negotiation should therefore be a combination of these three typology types.

The detailed discussion of negotiation model types in Table 1 indicates that mathematical type of model has severe limitations

**TABLE 1**  
**OVERVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION MODEL TYPOLOGY**

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models	
<b>Mathematical</b>					
(a) Continuous (mostly economical)	1. Exact result can be determined through mathematical analysis	1. Assumes rationality of negotiator	Theo- retical calculus	Zeuthen	1930
				Nash	1950
				Pen	1952
				Schelling	1960
	2. No semantically related problems	2. Utility functions have mathematical limitations		Foldes	1964
				Cross	1965
				Coddington	1968
				Harsanyi	1977
	3. Models can be refined by adding variables, relationships, etc.	3. Does not delineate factors that influence negotiation results			
				4. Does not lend itself to resolution of discrete negotiation issues	

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models
(b) Non-continuous (mostly game theory)	1 Realistic mathematical assumptions – not found in continuous models	1 Assumes rationality of negotiator	Theoretical algebra	Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) McKinsey (1952) Schelling (1960)
	2 Discrete negotiation issues	2 Prediction validity for face-to-face communication is questionable		Fouraker & Siegel (1963) Tedeschi et al. (1973)
	3 Empirically testable, especially in two-party situations	3 Does not lend itself to multiparty (>2) situations	Rapoport, Gyer & Gordon (1976)	
	4 “Best” result can be determined	4 Does not lend itself to the iterative process or dynamics of negotiations		
	5 Relative little semantically related problems	5 Payoff (utility) values may not be known for each choice		

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models
	6 Conceptual framework can be designed and altered			
(c) Hybrid	Strengths and weaknesses depend on the nature of the model		Primarily mathematical	Oliva & Capdevielle (1977)
<b>Verbal</b>				
(a) Process	1 Provides a realistic, understandable description of the negotiation process	1 Does not define optimal agreement or range of agreement	Verbal theory Boolean algebra	Homans (1950) Berne (1964) Walton & McKersie (1965) Peterson & Tracey (1977) Mastenbroek (1983)
	2 Factors influencing the negotiation process can be described	2 Semantic problems, e.g. concept definition, complicates comparison of models		

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models
	3 Allows the inclusion of an unlimited number of variables	3 No "equilibrium" result is defined		
		4 Empirical testing is limited because of model range – often to a few variables		
		5 Difficult to analyse the sequence of events		
(b) Phase (stages)	1 Strengths as process models	1 Limitations as process models, with the exception of no. 5	Verbal interaction analysis Markov analysis	Douglas (1957) Karrass (1970) Druckman (1973) Richardson (1977)

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models
	2 Permits analysis of negotiations that lead to a breakdown or settlement			Atkinson (1980) Zartman & Berman (1982) Pienaar & Robinson (1983)
(c) Elements	1 Strengths as process models	1 Limitations as process models	Verbal vector analysis	Weber (1961) McGarth (1966) Robinson (1977)
	2 May lend itself to mathematical treatment through vector analysis	2 Primary emphasis is placed on psychological elements with little attention to structural considerations		
(d) Limits	1 Strengths as process models	1 Process model limitation nos. 2 & 3	Verbal calculus	Pigou (1924) Stagner & Rosen (1965) Randle & Wortman (1966)

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Type	Strengths	Limitations	Language	Selected models
	2 Delineates a settlement range	2 Does not lend itself to resolution of discrete negotiation issues		
	3 More amenable to empirical testing than other verbal models			
	4 Provides some insight into the sequence of negotiation events			
(e) Intervention	Not discussed as it is not negotiation according to the definition in Chapter 2			Clarke (1977)
(f) Hybrid	Strengths and limitations depend on the nature of the model		Primarily verbal, depends on model	

in spite of its exactness and possibility of refinement. The number of negotiators participating is limited and rationality is accepted as a given. Most obvious are the limitations that this type of model has regarding description and representation of the process dynamics.

Non-mathematical models of negotiation also have limitations. The optimum point for agreement and the range of the agreement are difficult to determine. Problems with semantics, such as conceptualization, make comparison between models difficult, unless they are clearly defined. Empirical testing must be clearly limited because of the scope of the models and the potential variables that influence the negotiation process. Nevertheless, they do lend themselves to a fairly accurate representation of negotiation as complex human behaviour.

In the following chapter the research methods used to study negotiation – both those that developed from the theoretical approaches and those that have no direct connection with them – will be discussed.

# 4

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## Negotiation research

Our knowledge of human behaviour, such as negotiation, depends upon the verified research available on that particular behaviour. It stands to reason that our knowledge of negotiation depends on – and is reflected by – the research results available and the methods by which such knowledge is gained.

Pruitt's (1986:237) statement in the *Negotiation Journal* summarizes the state of negotiation knowledge:

“...the fields of negotiation and mediation subsist largely on a diet of maxims – prescriptive rules of thumb, succinct statements about what to do and not to do.”

The amount of articles published on negotiation leaves no doubt about the *quantity* of research on the subject. The question is, however, as to the *quality* of the research available. According to Weiss-Wik (1983:717) “there is little detectable concern for more credible forms of substantiation.”

Knowledge of negotiation can only be substantiated if it is based on sound research; research that is based on theory and

tested by empirical reality. Research published on negotiation, however, is often not as a result of scientific research, nor does it fully report the various steps in the research process (for example defining the concepts to be appraised, and the research design or methods used). This prevents the results from being verified – as is necessary for knowledge to be scientific. The knowledge emanating from negotiation research is dependent upon and closely related to the research methods used to obtain it.

Research methods employed in the negotiation field are as diverse as the negotiation theories themselves. This can probably be explained by the need to cope with such a complex and dynamic process as negotiation. “The richness of the negotiation process is not likely to be captured in a single experiment or even a line of experimentation. Rather it is through attempts to organize and integrate the specific aspects of negotiation...” (Druckman 1973:6).


At present there seems to be more research done on specific negotiation aspects than on integration of available negotiation knowledge, making it more accessible for use in practice. In the next chapter, an effort will be made to integrate what is known of this complex human behaviour. To be able to assess the value of this knowledge, the methods used to obtain it will be discussed.

Various ways to systematize research exist. Van Leent’s (1968) three research dimensions, the depth, height and breadth dimensions, will be used to organise the discussion on methods used in negotiation research.

## **RESEARCH DIMENSIONS**

Van Leent (1968) distinguished three research approaches or dimensions: the depth, height and breadth dimensions. Marais (1983) illustrated and explained these research dimensions as follows:

**Figure 3**  
**RESEARCH DIMENSIONS**



Research in the *depth* dimension focuses on an “understanding” of the phenomenon and usually results in qualitative data. Some research methods employed in this approach comprise theoretical analysis of the history of negotiation cases and a description of a particular negotiation setting. In the *height* dimension, experimental research methods are used to “explain” the phenomenon researched, resulting in quantitative data. The *breadth* dimension includes research such as field studies and surveys, by means of which the phenomenon studied is “described.”

The results obtained with these research methods vary greatly and each contributes to the complete picture. It is important to understand, however, what each has to offer and what type of research problems it can be applied to in the negotiation field.

### **Depth dimension**

Research in the depth dimension in the negotiation field includes direct observational case studies, retrospective case studies and

qualitative analysis of the negotiation process, or specific aspects of the process. The latter studies are mainly theoretical-conceptual by nature, utilising, for example, theoretical analysis in terms of the game theory, transactional analysis, or exchange theory. Examples of research methods that fall under the depth dimension are historical-ethnography and introspection.

### Historical-ethnography

Many negotiation studies are theoretical analyses of cases from a historical or ethnographical viewpoint. Gulliver (1979:64) used this method for example to study negotiation among African tribes. He explored the theoretical premise, “that negotiations and joint decision-making, in any society, deal with any kind of issue over which dispute occurs, that is with anything at all”, and the hypothesis that “there are common patterns and regularities of interaction between the parties in negotiation irrespective of the particular context or the issue in dispute.” Gulliver used direct observation in a variety of negotiation situations to study his hypotheses, where many other researchers that employ this method, often use descriptions of historically important negotiations – such as those on Vietnam – for their analyses.

The advantage of the analysis method used by Gulliver is that it can be used in real negotiation situations and factors that influence negotiation can be exposed to add to the knowledge of the process. Gulliver’s study spanned various cultures. More recent examples of this research method are Touval’s (1987) study of Arab-Israeli negotiations, and a study of a New York State negotiation by Vessels (1987).

This method does, however, have certain limitations. It is not possible to determine the external validity of the results of this type of research. It is therefore not possible to generalise the results in other negotiation situations. Comparison between cases is not possible, unless the framework used for the comparison is clearly spelled out – which makes the study less of a case study and more quantitative by nature.

## Self-reflective introspection

Bostrom (1983) and Krippendorf (1984) mention another depth research method used in negotiation research, namely self-reflective introspection. A participant or observer reflects on his observation of the negotiation. This method can provide a useful, overall view of the negotiation process. This overview must – by nature of the research method – be superficial, unverifiable and unstructured. Examples of this research can be found in negotiations that took place on Korea, Vietnam, the Middle-East, Zimbabwe and Namibia (see Zartman, Berman 1982:3).

Research methods in this dimension are mainly applied to gain a better understanding of the negotiation process as a whole; the result is qualitative data that reflect the nature of the process well, but that cannot be compared with or generalised in negotiation processes in general.

## Height dimension

Studies in the height dimension are usually simulated or laboratory studies that take place in situations where the negotiation process – and factors that influence the process – can be controlled to establish the result of a treatment. Many negotiation studies fall under this category (for example Bazerman, Neale 1982; Donohue, Diez, Hamilton 1984; Hillthrop, Rubin 1982; Putnam, Jones 1982; and Rapoport, Kahan 1984).

The results of the laboratory studies are usually quite useful in understanding the role of a particular variable in the controlled negotiation situation. Given the complex nature of real life negotiation, and the vast differences between the settings (the participants are usually students and the negotiation is not subject to the many factors in the environment that influence it), the results cannot be transferred to real negotiations. The results of Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984), and Konetchni's (1987) empirical research, and studies by Pruitt (1986) and others support this statement.

By far the greatest amount of research in negotiation has been done with methods that fall within the height dimension. The two methods most frequently found in research literature are game simulations and analysis of simulated negotiation interaction.

### Game simulations

For at least three decades, research based on the game theory principles was very popular amongst researchers. Many researchers still use game simulations for research, as these do not involve all the complexities of other simulations or real life research.

Game theory models or matrixes are designed and then tested in simulated situations to obtain the results of rational negotiating interaction, on a limited amount of issues by a limited amount of parties – usually two. The simplest form of the game matrix is the prisoners' dilemma.

**Figure 4  
PRISONER'S DILEMMA**

		Prisoner A	
		Not admit	Admit
Prisoner B	Not admit	0,0	10,0
	Admit	0,10	5,5

Research with this negotiation game entails the allocation of numerical values to the result of the alternative action chosen by two prisoners – in this case in terms of years imprisoned. If prisoner A decides to confess his crime, but not prisoner B, prisoner A turns state witness and is exonerated (0), while prisoner B is convicted (10). The same goes for prisoner B. If both confess, they are both convicted, but for a shorter period (5,5), and if neither confesses, no one can be convicted (0,0).

Rapoport (1974) reports a number of studies utilising the game matrix. These studies can be classified as two – person and

**Figure 5**

**EXPERIMENTAL GAME FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION**

		A		B					
		Right Button	Left Button	P	Q	P	Q		
P	Right Button	$\oplus, \oplus$	$\ominus, \oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\ominus$	$\ominus$	$\ominus$	$\oplus$
	Left Button	$\oplus, \ominus$	$\ominus, \ominus$	R	R	R	R	L	L
				$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\ominus$	$\ominus$
						$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$
								R	R
						$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$	$\oplus$

n-person games. An example of a game experiment was undertaken by Sidowski, Wycoff and Tabory in 1956. Two respondents were connected to a shock system and each given two switches that they could use. The object of the game is to accumulate the highest number of points and to avoid an electric shock. The respondents did not know that their choice influenced the other's results. If P used the left switch, O got a shock and if P used the right switch O got a point. The same criteria applied to O's reactions. If the shocks were strong, the respondents soon learnt which switch rewarded and which one shocked the other person.

Figure 5 A illustrates this game matrix and Figure 5 B the respondents' choice combinations.

More complex matrixes were used by Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 1962), Gallo (1966), and Beisecker (1970) to experiment on verbal persuasion strategies in mixed motive simulated negotiations.

Even though the simulated game experiments enabled the researchers to predict the negotiation results, they do not add to the ability to predict real negotiation outcomes. American politicians and ambassadors have been disillusioned with the use of games to help predict the outcome of certain alternative options (Gribbin 1983:434). The limitations of game theory based research results in real situations were discussed in the previous chapter.

### Negotiation interaction analysis

Negotiation interaction analysis is a method whereby negotiation interaction is systematically observed and coded with the aid of category systems developed to analyse negotiation at micro-level. All existing category systems have been developed in simulated negotiations. Very few have been tested in real life negotiations, such as those of Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984), which will be discussed under research undertaken in the breadth dimension.

A few observers, with or without the aid of recorders, observe the face-to-face interaction that takes place in these simulated negotiations and code the interactions according to the category system. An example of such category systems are those developed by Bales (1950), Putnam and Jones (1982), Donohue (1981), and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984). Bales's (1950) interactional process analysis category system, as prototype of the negotiation behaviour analysis methods, consists of 12 categories representing three major areas of behaviour: the positive and negative socio-emotional areas, and a neutral task area.

The analysis unit used is the smallest identifiable verbal and non-verbal behaviour, such as facial expressions or body position. Not only actions were analysed, but also the meaning of the message content and the situation in which it took place. Although Bales did not use his system to analyse negotiations, it indicated the possibility and led to a great deal of research based on his work – for example that by Landsberger (1955), Theye and Seiler (1979), Sermat (1970), Stern, Sternthal, Craig (1975), and Hunger and Stern (1976).


Bales's IPA could not, however, identify strategies, commitments and concessions that take place in negotiations, and as a result, researchers started developing their own category systems. The three systems that were extensively refined and have survived researchers' probes are the Conference Process Analysis Method (CPA), the Negotiation Process Analysis Method (NPA), and the Negotiation Cue Response Coding Method (NCRC).

McGrath and Julian (1963), Lewis and Fry (1977), and Zechmeister and Druckman's (1973) systems merged in the NPA method of Hopmann and Walcott (1976). Their category system consists of five dimensions and 13 categories: content (initiation, accommodation, pull back); strategic behaviour (commitments, threats, promises); task (agreements, disagreements, questions, answers); affective behaviour (positive, negative); and process (subject changes).

Putnam and Jones (1982) extended this category system and used it to analyse management-labour negotiations. These

Figure 6

**BALES' INTERACTIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS  
CATEGORY SYSTEM**



systems enabled the researchers to analyse the content and the sequence of the negotiation strategies (both distributive and integrative), but do not provide insight into the negotiation relationship (the basis of all negotiation behaviour) and the way the use of specific negotiation tactics indicates the use of broader negotiation strategies (Nieuwmeijer 1988b).

Morley and Stephenson's (1977) CPA method consists of three dimensions: (a) the type of information exchange (rejection, acceptance, etc.), (b) nine categories of information types, and (c) seven referent categories (subject of the message such as self, opponent, party). The results of these researchers' studies, and others based on their category system, do not fall within the scope of this work and are discussed in detail by Nieuwmeijer (1988a).

Donohue (1981) and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984) solved the problem of including the coding of the negotiation relationship in the behaviour and strategy used, by coding each action twice – as cue or response for behaviour and as defensive, attacking or integrative behaviour – in their NCRA. A detailed critique of this system and the results achieved with it can be found in Nieuwmeijer's (1988a) *Analyzing intercultural negotiation in Southern Africa*.

### **Breadth dimension**

Research in the breadth dimension includes data collection methods such as questionnaires, interviews, and surveys. An important issue perceived in real life that is not well understood can be researched with the use of these methods, by developing hypotheses about it and then testing the hypotheses. The influence of the negotiators' credibility on the negotiation process – in which data is collected through questionnaires – is an example of such a study (De Koning, Hall 1988).

Studies in the breadth dimension can also be stimulated by theory on, for example, the effect of mood on negotiation. Concepts pertinent to an understanding of mood can be put into operation and researched with the aid of the above mentioned methods in the empirical reality.

## Interviews

Interviews are usually preferred to questionnaires, as the knowledge available on negotiation is not yet of such a nature that questionnaires can be drawn up with confidence, and relevant variables – for example traditional elements that influence negotiation in Southern Africa (Nieuwmeijer 1987) – can be elicited from the negotiators themselves. Interviews also allow the respondent to be more flexible in terms of the issues raised, while saving the busy negotiator the time and effort to complete a questionnaire.

Interviews may be more or less structured, depending on the purpose of the interview. Zartman and Berman (1982) used semi-structured interviews, based on previous case studies they had conducted, to establish what knowledge experienced negotiators have acquired that may be of use to other negotiators. They did not ask set questions with limited choice answers, but simply asked one question during personal interviews: “What do you know now, that you would have liked to know when you started negotiating for the first time?” The interviews were conducted with senior negotiators in key negotiation positions in the American and other diplomatic services, and 50 United Nations ambassadors and members of the secretariat.

## Direct observation in real situations

The greatest lack of research exists in this type of study, even though research done in this manner could be extremely effective and productive to an understanding of negotiation as it takes place in real life.

An extensive literature search conducted by Nieuwmeijer (1988a) revealed only two studies of this nature: those by Rackam (1979), and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984).

### *Analysing successful negotiators' behaviour*

Rackam (1979) analysed the behaviour of successful negotiators through direct observation. He defined “successful” as:

- seen as successful by negotiators of both sides,
- having a track record of significant success, and
- having a low incidence of implementation failures.

Rackam observed the frequency of certain key negotiation actions such as irritators, counter proposals, defend/attack spirals, behaviour labelling, information seeking, questions and summarizing.

### *Analysing negotiation interaction*

Behaviour analysis consists of methods used to analyse and describe human behaviour. The basic unit used in the analysis is usually the *transaction* – that is the exchange of paired sequential messages over a period of time. Research done with this method has this basic research unit (the transaction) in common, but can vary on the following aspects – according to Rogers and Farace (1975:223):

- the amount and complexity of categories used;
- the number of inferences by the observer (from a minimum inference on the purpose, expectations, functions, to difficult inferences on the basis of complex analysis);
- the breadth of the application (from specific type negotiation situations to very broad applications);
- the message exchange point of focus (emphasizing the content, the process of exchange, or dimensions such as division of time);
- the purpose or result of the interaction (does the focus lie with the communicators' meaning, the result of the process, or the group function of the message?); and
- the unit of analysis (the analysis of single messages to a focus on sequentially organised messages that reflect the process aspect of the interaction).

It has only been in the last decade, however, that negotiation behaviour or interaction has been analysed in this way.

One of the most prominent studies using this method and reflecting the accumulated knowledge available on negotiation interaction analysis as discussed under the height dimension, is the study by Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984). They observed negotiations between labour and management and identified strong patterns of communication strategies used in the negotiation.

Their category system was adapted for – and applied to – intercultural negotiations in Southern Africa (Nieuwmeijer 1988b). This research revealed interesting negotiation patterns, the formation of intercultural negotiating relationships, and the strategies used in a wide spectrum of negotiations in Southern Africa. The complex nature of negotiation and the sensitivity of the issues being discussed, are two of the reasons for the lack of research by means of this method.

Rackam (1979:7) summarises this problem as follows:

“Very few studies have investigated what actually goes on face-to-face during a negotiation. Two reasons account for this lack of published research. Firstly, real negotiators are understandably reluctant to let a researcher watch them at work. Such research requires the consent of both negotiating parties and constitutes a constraint on a delicate situation. The second reason for the poverty of research in this area is the lack of methodology. Until recently there were few techniques available which allowed an observer to collect data on the behaviour of negotiators without the use of cumbersome and unacceptable methods such as questionnaires.”

Rackam (1979:7) reports, for example, that despite the necessary precautions, he still had to cancel 20 negotiation session observations because of the sensitivity of the subject.

The behaviour interaction analysis studies have great potential for negotiation research as they can focus on the *process* of negotiation, use the transaction between participants, and not

single unrelated actions, as research unit, and they lend themselves to the analysis of multi-party and multi-issue negotiations. They are, however, currently used to analyse simulated negotiation situations, with the exception of Donohue, Diez and Hamilton's (1984) study. These authors found in their study that significant differences exist between simulated and natural or real life negotiations.

Although field experiments are ideal, they are difficult to execute, because of the problems entailed in manipulating negotiation variables in naturalistic settings.

## **CONCLUSION**

The type of research method used in negotiation determines the value of the available knowledge. Most of the research is in the form of simulated studies, where causal relationships between variables are synthetically manipulated. These research methods are extremely useful, as all the practical problems and external influences are circumvented, but the applicability of the results in real life negotiation is in serious doubt.

Field research such as negotiation interaction analysis and interviews based on participants' experience in naturalistic negotiations, proved to be of value in understanding negotiation, but they still need a great deal of refinement.

In an era where negotiation is becoming an increasingly important process to manage conflict in many areas of life, it is essential to systematize and extend the knowledge on negotiation so that it becomes more accessible and therefore useful. It is also necessary to pool all research resources and methods to gain more useful knowledge, for example, to develop research designs that enable the researcher to compare results of research done with different research methods, and methods that enable one to collect qualitative and quantitative data so that the results reflect the richness of the negotiation process as well as being exact and applicable to other negotiation situations.

There are still many areas in negotiation research that need attention, such as intercultural negotiation in Southern Africa in its broadest sense, guidelines for the formulation of negotiation techniques and strategies, and key negotiators' personality characteristics (Nieuwmeijer 1988a; Pottas 1987). Crucial research, however, should be directed at establishing a theory for negotiation methodology, in other words, how should research on negotiation be conducted to ensure the best possible results that will enhance our knowledge of negotiation.

# 5

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## Elements of Negotiation

The negotiation *process* as defined in chapter two, is influenced by many *elements*. These elements, such as persuasion, conflict, trust and the particular context, are often processes in their own right. Volumes have already appeared on each one of these elements, but for the purpose of this book a concise synopsis of each will be given.

Negotiation is also a dynamic human communication *system*, where information is formulated by the participants in the form of negotiation tactics and strategies, exchanged and interpreted within the negotiation context and the developing relationship.

The elements discussed in this chapter influence the negotiation process, are also being influenced by the process and by each other. Power, for example, does not exist without perception. Although the elements are interdependent, for the sake of completeness and clarity, they will be discussed separately.

### PERCEPTION

Perception is the process by which man ascribes meaning to information. Mortensen (1972:69) defines perception as, “. . . how man translates raw sensory data into meaningful experience. . .”

This makes perception a key element in negotiation.

## THE PROCESS AND DYNAMICS OF PERCEPTION

Milburn (1977: 137) states the importance of perception in negotiation as follows:

“To function well together the superpowers need to be able to predict accurately the perceptions and responses of one another and, as a second-order perception, to understand that the messages that they as threat sources emit are thoroughly understood. Attention to the way the other perceives threats enables one to ascertain whether threats designed to inhibit violence are likely to provoke it.”

Fischer (1981:22) argues that negotiation occurs as a result of a difference in opinion. Because people perceive differently, conflict arises which must be solved through negotiation.

The process of perception comprises three phases, namely the *obtaining* or retrieving of information, the *evaluation* of information, the forming of associations and the *assigning of meaning* to these associations (Nieuwmeijer 1981:20-21).

These dynamics and creativity of perception are the essence of successful negotiation. Man does not perceive passively, but assigns meaning to the perceived information and places it in an acceptable and useful pattern – negotiation tactics. Devito (1978: 121) describes perception and its creative nature as follows:

“Each percept (that which is perceived), from the simplest to the most complex, is the product of a creative act. . . We can never encounter a stimulus before some meaning has been assigned to it by some perceiver. . . Therefore, each perception is the beneficiary of all previous perception in turn, each new perception leaves its mark on the common pool. A percept is thus a link between the past which gives it its meaning and the future which it helps to interpret.”

It is precisely this interpretive function that causes so many problems in negotiation, or alternatively, makes it successful. According to Adler and Rodman (1982:42), and Mortensen (1972:70), the interpretation of perceived information is based on previous experience, assumptions about human behaviour, expectations, knowledge, and current physical and psychological conditions. It is therefore imperative that negotiators should be aware of the influence of these factors on their perception in negotiating situations. Stereotyping is in particular a serious perception problem: it is, generalisation about a class of people, objects or cultures (Tubbs, Moss 1974:84), which prejudices the negotiator against his opponents.

Perception plays a role in every phase of negotiation: planning, face-to-face communication, and the implementation of the decision.

## **THE ROLE OF NEEDS AND GOALS IN PERCEPTION**


Perception is in turn influenced by the parties' needs (Karrass 1970:121), goals (Atkinson 1980:34), exertion of power (Bacharach, Lawler 1981: 45), culture (Mortensen 1973:295), which determine the semantic value and therefore the interpretation of the communication, and by the functioning of the negotiating process itself. "The bargaining process consists of offers and communications which are intended to influence an opponent's perceptions of alternatives and utilities" (Druckman 1973:26).

Perception in the negotiation process is also influenced by the perceptions of others. Hatch (1979:19) maintains that, "You can't expect to have much effect upon another person's perceptions and behaviour if you refuse to allow him or her to affect your own perceptions and behaviour." Perception is therefore a learning process, and as the negotiating process progresses, it should be adjusted accordingly.

Karrass (1970:120-122) maintains that perception is affected, by man's hierarchy of needs as explained by Maslow.

Figure 7

MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS




According to Maslow (1954), needs are linked to goals. All behaviour strives towards the attainment of some goal. When the achievement of this goal has been satisfied, the next goal in the hierarchy becomes the aim. That is why it is essential to focus on the other parties' needs and not their stated positions.

According to Karrass (1970:121-122), the behaviour of negotiators is usually predictable, based on the perception of their goals and needs. Figure 8, however, illustrates that the interaction between needs, goals, and perception is not as simple as it sounds.

Figure 8

PERCEPTION, GOALS AND NEEDS – KARRASS



If a party could accurately perceive the other party's needs and goals, he will be able to predict that party's behaviour and plan effective strategies and techniques to obtain the desired results.

MEASURING PERCEPTION IN NEGOTIATION

Rotter (1966) has developed a scale that measures the influence of perception on negotiating behaviour. The "locus of

control” – the way in which human behaviour is controlled – is used as the criterion. Bobbit (1967) used Rotter’s scale in his experiments and found that individuals with an internal locus of control, are less sensitive to others’ perceptions and therefore less influenced by their behaviour. Individuals with an external locus of control are less concerned about their own gain and more interested in interpersonal behaviour. They are therefore more inclined towards co-operation, while the first group exhibits behaviour that is more competitive.

In the light of the importance of perception in negotiation, much more research about the role of this negotiating element in negotiating behaviour is required. The restructuring of perception, in order to be seen as successful is one of the problem areas that should be examined.

## **POWER**

“The concept of power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast” (Dahl, 1957:201).

Although power may be as old as negotiation itself, the study thereof has been sorely neglected. Pfeffer (1981: 2) offers the following reasons for this state of affairs:

- (a) the concept “power” is problematical in most social scientific literature;
- (b) power is important (also in negotiation), but it is not the only significant factor; and
- (c) the implementation of expertise on power is problematical as a result of the implications and connotations inherent in the concept.

Mintzberg (1983:xiv) summarizes in one phrase the problem of conceptualizing power: “. . . power is a sly and elusive phenomenon.” Mintzberg found the literature so diverse and meagre, the concept definition so elusive and the phenomenon so complicated that he had to review his hefty work on power seven times between 1971 and July 1982.

Power is described by Dahl (1957:201) as a “bottomless swamp” and by Perrow (1970:ix) as “the messiest problem of all.”

## What is power

Power is therefore a concept as difficult to define, as it is complicated. The literature studied throws little light on the nature and function of power. Power is, however, a social reality and so relevant in negotiation that one should attempt to define and examine it.

As starting point for an examination of power the dictionary definition (Concise Oxford Dictionary) is used, namely that power *is the ability to do, to obtain, or bring about something.*

Definitions of power can be divided into three types, namely:

- (a) The attainment of *goals*, for example, Chamberlain's (in Bacharach, Lawler 1981: 37) definition: ". . . the capacity of a party to produce an agreement on its own terms."
- (b) The *relationship* and actions of actors A & B, for example, Dahl's (1957:202-203) definition of power in terms of the division of the power between actor A and actor B.
- (c) The *ability to bring about something*. Emerson (1962:32) describes power as the resistance B has to overcome in order to accomplish something. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) view negotiating power as the potential of one party to influence another's results, and Zartman (1974:396) sees it as the ability to direct another's behaviour as desired.

A simple definition of negotiating power that includes all these elements is

*the ability to influence the negotiating results.*

## Elements of power

Power building is a process that takes place in negotiation and is influenced, according to Mintsberg (1983:3) by basic elements such as

- (a) the manipulators, power users or power builders in negotiation – the negotiators or parties;

- (b) the sources of power and channels through which power is exercised;
- (c) the goals of power building; and
- (d) the structure or configurations of power – for example closed systems, autocracy, democracy, the political arena.

## **Principles of power**

Karrass (1970:56) identifies eight basic principles of power, namely:

- (a) Power is always relative. It hardly ever belongs totally to one party.
- (b) Power can be real or false. One of the parties may be in a strong position of power, but if he or the other party does not recognise or realise this, it is of no consequence.
- (c) Power can be exercised without action. If the other party believes that action could or would be taken against him, the action is not necessary.
- (d) Power is always limited. The extent depends on the situation, laws, ethical standards, and current and future competition.
- (e) Power exists to the degree that it is accepted. Certain parties are less willing to be dominated than others.
- (f) The end goal of power cannot be distinguished from the means. The other party will not negotiate again, if he feels that he has been exploited.
- (g) The exertion of power always involves costs and risks.
- (h) Power relations change eventually. The balance of power changes as the balance of the parties' advantages and contributions changes.

Coser (1975:151) adds two more principles to those of Karrass's, namely:

- (a) in the end the exertion of power depends on the ability to apply sanctions should there be no compliance; and
- (b) power always refers to a social relationship between at least two parties.

Goldstein and Sies (1974:44) differentiate between two types of power relations: symmetrical and complimentary. When both parties respect one another and share the responsibility of the success of the negotiation, there is a symmetrical power relationship. An acknowledgement of differences leads to a complimentary power relationship where each party strives to build his own power.

## Sources of power

How does power originate, or what can be used to build power?

Sources from which power originates, or is built, exist in the negotiating situation, the negotiator, or outside both of these.

Situational power

- (a) *Power of expertise.*

This refers to the amount of knowledge that individuals or groups have relative to one another. If one party has a need for power, the other party will have power that is relative to the dependence of that party.

- (b) *Legitimate power.*

Legitimate power is defined as the power that arises from internalised values in person A that determine that person B has a legitimate right to influence A and that it is B's *duty* to accept that influence (French, Raven 1968: 192). In all cases the sense of legitimacy is based on a code or standard accepted by the individual and used as external power agent by another. An example of this would be cultural or ethnic norms or values, or

ground rules layed down for the purpose of negotiation. Legitimate power may also be transferred to a subordinate.

(c) *Referred power*

This is power which a party obtains as a result of his association with a strong or authoritarian party that is highly regarded by the opposing party. This is usually achieved by name dropping during a conversation.

(d) *Power of reward*

This is based on the ability to reward the other party. The strength of the power increases with the importance of the reward. The reward does not have to be tangible, it can be psychological. This power is especially important when concessions are granted, which will be discussed later.

(e) *Coercive power*

Coercive power is the ability of a party to enforce actions which leave the other party with negative options only. This power is not often used in negotiating situations, with the exception of threats.

(f) *Official power*

This power is based on the position or office that a person or party holds. Official power could be seen as, and is often confused with, legitimate power. Official power however is vested in the office and not the person. It can therefore be seen as "official power" that is bestowed upon a person who holds an office and it may be used when acting in an official capacity. It was, for example, only since Yuri Andropof had become president of Russia that his power was connected with the government of the USSR.

(g) *Power of coalition*

Parties or individuals often decide to band together about a particular matter. They then form a coalition of power in order to achieve a specific goal (see page 138 for further particulars about the forming of coalitions). This formation provides the

parties with more and a greater variety of resources, which may influence to the success of the negotiation.

(h) *Team power*

A team will naturally have more power than an individual, because they will have more resources at their disposal. It is a known fact that negotiation between teams is more successful than between individuals. The total power available to a team depends on the composition of the team. The team should therefore be selected carefully, so that the necessary power resources are on hand.

(i) *Other situational power sources*

Karrass (1970: 61-63) also identifies the following situational power sources: the difference between parties regarding commitment, competition, uncertainty, courage, bargaining skill, time and effort.

### Personal power

Apart from situational power, the motivation of the individual is also a source of power (McClelland 1961). The individual can have three motives or sources of power, namely:

- (a) achievement, which is task directed,
- (b) a need for power, which according to McClelland and Burnham (1976:103) has the greatest influence on negotiation; and
- (c) affiliation, which is directed at personal relations.

### Other power resources

Certain power sources are not to be found in people, teams or in the negotiating situation, but lie outside of these. Examples are the economic market and the possession of strategic resources.

(a) *The market*

Power in the market is the ability to persuade the other party to follow a strategy envisaged by the negotiator. For example, there is more power in product or service monopolies, according to the law of supply and demand, than when there is competition in the market. According to Galbraith (1962:125) this law is only controlled by “. . . the countervailing power of those who are subject to it.”

(b) *Product image*

A product may develop an image that gives it great negotiating power. An example of this is Hewlett-Packard's image in the calculator industry and Coca-Cola, in the soft drinks industry.

(c) *Possession of strategic resources*

A resource is usually strategic when too little of it or a limited amount is available. Such a resource gives the owner power in negotiation, for example, the oil power of the Middle-East countries and South Africa's mineral power.

(d) *Control of alternatives*

“The more alternatives an organisation has available relative to its opponents, the more power it has” (MacMillan 1974:20). If the Nuclear Energy Board is the only organisation that employs nuclear technologists, it will control the alternatives and power in this field.

(e) *Use of a third party*

When a party does not have a strong power base it might be expedient to use a third party; for example employees' use of trade unions.

(f) *Meeting place*

The negotiation venue, is a source of power. Thus a negotiation between America and Russia will never occur in either the USA or the USSR.


## Indicators and circumstances for the use of power

Indicators of power can vary from verbal and non-verbal communication to positioning, physical location, salary, and representation in meetings. The negotiating situation determines the indicators.

The circumstances in which power is used, vary greatly. Pfeffer (1981: 69) provides the following model for *why* and *when* power will be used.

Figure 9

### CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE USE OF POWER



The model offers the following conditions for power use:

- (a) interdependence – the use of power by one negotiator influences the power of the other;
- (b) heterogeneous goals – the end goal of negotiators (the successful achievement of an agreement) must correspond

in order to be successful; if the end goals do not correspond, power building takes place;

- (c) scarcity – rare resources cause power building: the more severe the degree of scarcity, the greater the power build-up and the greater the attempt should be at resolving the conflict.

## Perception of power

“An accurate perception of the power distribution in the social arena in which he lives is . . . a necessary prerequisite for the man seeking powerful support for his demands” (Pettigrew 1973: 240).

Accurate perception does not only influence power build-up, but power must be perceived to have any effect, or indeed to exist. The negotiator must think or know that he has power, and the opponent must believe and accept this. As the essence of power is perception, a party never really commands power, unless he is perceived as the possessor of power. The party's own and other parties' perception of that party's access to resources and the value of those resources, determine the force of the power (Pienaar, Robinson, 1983:7).

The perception of power involves more than the mere question, “How much power do I have relative to my opponent?” According to Karrass (1970:64), other information required for the accurate perception of power, falls under two categories:


- A. Questions related to the negotiator's power:
  - 1. How does the negotiator perceive his own power?
  - 2. How does the negotiator think his opponent sees his power?
  - 3. How would the negotiator like his opponent to see his power?
- B. Questions related to the opponent's power:
  - 1. How does the negotiator perceive the opponent's power?

2. How does the opponent perceive his own power?
3. How would the opponent like the negotiator to see his power?

Karrass (1970:65) maintains that the perception of power is connected to the power sources and the type of negotiation. He illustrates this in the following diagram.

**Figure 10**

**KARRASS'S MODEL OF POWER PERCEPTION**



It is clear, according to Figure 10 that perception plays an important role in power building.

## Power goals


A party must decide what his own and the other party's power goals are.

According to Mintzberg (1983), goals and power are inseparable. The perception of power and power building will depend on the number and the nature of the negotiator's goals.

The goals or aspirational level of a negotiator can be decided on or determined with the aid of a technique such as Atkinson's (1980:44) Expectation Test.

Negotiating goals are arranged between two positions, namely the base level and the aspirational level. The base level is the lowest possible offer that will be accepted, while the aspirational level is the goal towards which is strived or aspired. The positions are not static and may be moved many times during a negotiating situation. Robinson (1977:199) represents the goal positions as follows:

Figure 11



The opponent's aspirational basis or goal aspirations is not known and must be perceived, estimated or determined by

means of questions. If the opponent should have a higher aspirational base, or greater power, power build-up will occur.

Strategy to achieve the goals of power building may be determined by asking the following questions (Karrass, 1970:67):

- (a) Could I extend my power base level by taking some action that I am not currently performing?
- (b) Could I extend my power base level by allowing or forcing the opponent to perform an action in which he is not engaged at the moment?
- (c) Could I extend my power base level by conjoining my opponent and myself in an action that we are not doing now?
- (d) Could I extend my power base level by not continuing an action that I am now doing?
- (e) Could I extend my power base level by restraining my opponent from a current action?
- (f) Could I extend my power base level by restraining my opponent, as well as myself, from a current action?

An example of (d) is Britain's threat to the USA in the late fifties to disestablish their military base in South East Asia, unless America grants Britain more favourable trade and military concessions. Britain thus extended her power by threatening to desist from an action which America needed to have continued in order to achieve her own objectives.

One should always keep in mind that power building leads to more power building, which results in unnecessary escalation of power exertion.

## **The use of, consequences of, and need for power**

### **Use of power**

The results of negotiation do not depend on how much power a party has, but on whether it can be perceived and whether it can

be used, should the need arise. The party must be aware of the extent of the power, how it is composed, how to build it and how to use it in order for it to be effective. According to Bacharach and Lawler (1981: 43), power constitutes the tactical possibilities for action in negotiation.

The paradox of power is that it is not always the obvious person who could utilize it the most effectively. It is not the most intelligent, physically strongest, most rational, or person with the largest financial resources who obtains the best results. Agreement is often reached, because a negotiator's bluff has not been called, a final offer was interpreted as final instead of as a feeler, or because a negotiator has acted irrationally and played on the others' feelings. An agent who has been restricted by his superiors has more bargaining power in certain situations than someone who has total jurisdiction that enables him to make large concessions. This use of power has already been successfully employed on several occasions against America by Russia and Japan (Karrass 1970:55-64).

Apart from using a negotiating agent, there are other uses of power:

(a) *No power*

There is power in possessing no power (Karrass 1970:68). A teenager who is punished for unacceptable behaviour may, for instance, reject his parents' power and retribution by running away from home. They will probably ask him to return. The tears of a helpless woman have also caused many a negotiation to turn in her favour.

(b) *Brinkmanship*

Brinkmanship was used by John Foster Dulles during his term as minister of Foreign Affairs for the USA. His concept of diplomacy was based on large scale reprisal. If Russia should start a war, America would terminate it at all costs. This use of power is a valid, but a very dangerous way of trying to maintain a

balance of power. In the industry, this use of power is found in threats to withdraw from negotiation, or enlist a mediator.

(c) *Focus points*

Focus points are sometimes contained in the situation. They are linked to social or economic factors and play a role in establishing power relations between opponents. An example of focus points in power sharing is dividing a pie into quarters for four people, or the use of a river as boundary in the division of land in a tribal land dispute (even though one section of the land may be smaller), or the use of the thirty eighth parallel degree of latitude as dividing line in Korea. It is easier to reach an agreement when "splitting the difference" is used as focus point. This form of power sharing, though not always fair, is the easiest.

(d) *Irrationality*

It is sometimes expedient to be unreasonable and irrational. There is no law which decrees that a negotiator has to be rational. If the opponent is convinced that the negotiator is emotionally committed to his irrational viewpoint, the negotiator possesses power.

(e) *Influence*

Influence has a broader and less negative meaning than power. Influence is therefore considered to be more acceptable. This is the restructuring of the other party's perception in order for them to act as expected. Influence may occur during verbal or non-verbal communication and requires a credible influencer, a knowledge of the other's value system, relevance to the situation, and a knowledge of the alliance structures.

Tendeschi, Schlenker and Sonoma (1973:85) illustrate the modes of influence that are available to a party, as follows:

Figure 12

**MODES OF INFLUENCE**

		Open influence	Manipulation
		Threats and Promises	Reinforcement Control
source mediates reinforcements	YES		
	NO	Persuasion (warnings & mendations)	Information Control 1. Cue control 2. Filtering of information 3. Warnings & mendations

Influence is therefore also a form of power use.

Need for power

The need for power arises as a result of a variety of reasons. These reasons are related to aspects such as Maslow's hierarchy of needs (for instance self actualisation or the gratification of social needs), personality characteristics of the negotiator, or circumstances within the situation (as discussed on page 53 under situational power).

Consequences of power use

The consequences of power use are unique to each situation. Inequality is an important result of power use and may also be the cause for power building. Before inequality can be understood, it is necessary to discuss position first.

*Position* is the place or status held by a person. In negotiation this means the importance that the other parties ascribe to a party or individual. Position plays an important role in power, as it influences perception.

If a party perceives that his position (and therefore also his power) is not equal to that of the other party, an imbalance or inequality results (Hamblin, Kunkel 1977:165). Emerson (1969:388) considers inequality a result of the balance of power and inherent in the structure of the negotiation. Whatever the cause of inequality may be, it has a definite influence on the behaviour of the participants.

Rubin and Brown (1975:221) examined 28 studies on the influence of inequality on behaviour and found that

- (a) the unequal distribution of power usually results in less successful negotiations than equal distributions;
- (b) parties with greater power act more manipulatively towards those with less power (there is disparity about this statement in the literature that was studied);
- (c) parties with less power may form coalitions, or attempt some form of power building.

### **Approaches to and measurement of power**

From the extensiveness of the literature on power and the complexity of the phenomenon, it stands to reason that there are different approaches to power. All the literature that has been examined, however, perceives power as an important negotiation element. Some authors, such as Bacharach and Lawler (1981: 43) and Schmickl (1977), even go as far as to consider power the basis or crux of negotiation.

The literature that has been studied also indicates strongly that power is specific to a relationship or situation. Power should therefore be approached from a structural point of view and interpreted within the situation in which it manifests.

Pfeffer (1981: 4) identifies the following measurement problems in power:

- (a) what happens if power is not present;
- (b) what are the objectives of the one who is exercising his power; and
- (c) how do the actions affect the probability of achieving power building goals?

## Summary

A considerable amount is known about the players in a power-game, as well as about the sources of power, and the circumstances for the use of power, but there is still a need for information about the nature and functioning of power. Mintzberg (1983:xiv and i) reiterates this need: "More important, though, is the nature of the phenomenon"; ". . . , that what is of interest in the study of power in and around organisations who gets it, when, how and why, . . ."

Therefore, because power is situation bound, its role in the negotiating situation will have to be examined specifically.

## CREDIBILITY

"Credibility refers to the image of a source in any communicative situation" (Mortensen 1972:145). Credibility is therefore the receiver's perception of certain characteristics attributed to the source. The receiver must believe that the information that is communicated is credible.

The concept "credibility" has been identified 2 300 years ago by Aristotle. In his Rhetoric (Devito 1978:79) he writes that "persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. There are things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character – the three, namely, that induce in us to believe a

thing apart from any proof of it: good sense; good moral character and good will.” The perception of certain character attributes (not tangible characteristics) therefore leads to a belief in the truth of the sender’s message. The three characteristics identified by Aristotle continue to play an important role in the success of negotiation.

Hovland and Weiss (1951) are pioneers in the research on credibility characteristics. They found that dependability and accomplishment are such characteristics. Since Hovland and Weiss’s research, a variety of studies have been launched in this field.

Bostrom (1983: 68-73) differentiates between two approaches in research on the characteristics of credibility, namely, factor analytical approaches and alternative approaches. The factor analytical approach has been followed by researchers such as Berlo, Lemmert and Mentz (1969), Baudhuin and Davis (1972); Mortensen (1972); and Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974). They have isolated the following factors:

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| Berlo, Lemmert and Mentz | – security<br>qualifications<br>dynamics   |
| Baudhuin and Davis       | – authority<br>attractiveness<br>respect<br>personal integrity   |
| Mortensen                | – authority (which he perceives to<br>be informed, qualified,<br>intelligent, valuable, and<br>expert knowledge)<br>dependability (perceived as<br>honest, friendly, acceptable,<br>et cetera)<br>dynamics |

Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey	– capability character equanimity sociability extroversion
-------------------------------	--

Alternative approaches to the examination of credibility characteristics were taken by Cronkhite and Liska (1976), Liska (1978) and McLaughlin (1975). Cronkhite and Liska (1976) and Liska (1978) maintain that there are methodological and statistical problems in the factor analytical approach and that the characteristics are influenced by the goal, situation, and the use of information in the communication process. In contrast to the factor analytical methods, McLaughlin makes use of a non-metric multidimensional scale. His findings indicate that the perceiver's ideologies, earnestness, and his image of the sender are important elements that influence credibility.

The literature that has been examined indicates that the credibility of the source definitely has an influence on communication effectiveness in negotiation. If the perceiver considers the source to be credible, he will not only accept the information more readily, but his negotiation behaviour will tend to be positive.

## **PERSONALITY**

Negotiation is the face-to-face interaction between two or more parties, with the aim to reach an agreement. The parties, however, are not abstract representatives, but people with emotions, and values and who live in a real world. (Fisher, Ury 1981: 19). Although it is essential to separate the person and the problem in order to reach an agreement, insight in the participants' personalities is also necessary to reach an effective agreement. The reason for negotiating failures is often a lack of knowledge of the "failure of human relations" (Hannah 1981: 2).

### **Personality traits for successful negotiators**

Research on the role of personality in the negotiating situation, or the type of personality traits that make a negotiator successful

is rare and discouraging; “. . . research on effect of personality on negotiation behaviour is generally discouraging” (Druckman 1977:247).

A problem common to the human sciences is encountered in negotiation personality research: behaviour can be measured, but the intrinsic element of personality, which induces behaviour, is difficult to measure (Drucker 1982:62).

Literature that does cover negotiation personality falls under three categories predominantly, namely:

- (a) anecdotal, or “this is how it is done,” reports by successful negotiators – usually based on the actual situation, but very subjective and personal;
- (b) so called theoretical models which are idealised, complex, unverified and difficult to apply in actuality; and
- (c) laboratory studies conducted over a short term and which are somewhat artificial.

Statements or predictions about the personality of successful negotiators, however, are often bandied about.

### Atkinson

Atkinson (1980:22) lays down three requirements for a successful negotiator, namely:

- (a) flexibility in dealing with individuals and situations,
- (b) an awareness of everything and everybody around him, and
- (c) sensitivity.

### Chelune

According to Chelune (1979:28), self-revelation is a criterion of a good negotiator. Self-revelation is the verbal presentation of

the self to other individuals. If a person finds it easy to communicate about him (her)self, it is easier to establish a relationship and thus negotiate more successfully. According to Archer (1979: 30), such a person would not be dogmatic, impulsive and anxious, and would exchange social rewards such as information and concessions.

### Druckman

According to Druckman (1977:250-252), motivation is an important element, which enables the negotiator to manipulate a situation. Motivation springs from needs, perception, the situation, et cetera.

### Zartman and Berman

Zartman and Berman (1982:16) maintains that, “. . . negotiators are made, not born . . .” They consider personality an important element that influences negotiation, but not the only element. They have identified certain personality and attitudinal traits and surmises that they do influence certain actions, but the relations between these variables must still be determined. These personality traits are

- (a) integrity – dependability;
- (b) empathy – it is essential to understand the other party’s standpoint, even if only to improve one’s own reaction;
- (c) value adjustment and accommodation – learning must be allowed to take place over time, in order to solve problems and to accomplish effective communication (sometimes also within parties);
- (d) self-assurance – “a certain courage is needed if you are to succeed as a negotiator” (Zartman, Berman 1982:20);
- (e) ingenuity – the ability to proffer new arguments, and especially, alternative suggestions when differences arise;
- (f) stamina – especially under mental and physical pressure; stamina to persevere is more important than any intelligent

arguments, was Harriman's (the USA's delegate) opinion after his interview with prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.

The following personality traits are *weak* characteristics in a negotiator, according to Zartman and Berman (1982:22-23):

- (a) the need to be *liked* and to be seen as friendly: “. . . it is essential to create maximum clarity in terms of what the issues are and what the options are”, and not to be seen as a reasonable person;
- (b) involvement in personal situations. It is important to stick to the goal;
- (c) *the inability to control emotions*. “One maxim is never to lose your temper unless you intend to”, are the words of Philip C. Jessup, previous special delegate of the USA.

Zartman and Berman (1982:23) express their perception of the connection between specific personality traits, attitudes and negotiating behaviour, based on their experimental studies, as follows:

- (a) the more complex and tense the situation and the clearer the definition of roles in the situation, the less significant the influence of the personality variables will be on the negotiating behaviour;
- (b) the greater the uncertainty about the goal and the opponents' goals, the greater the tendency will be for personality variables to have an influence on negotiating behaviour;
- (c) negotiating behaviour is most closely linked to aspects of the immediate situation which confronts the negotiator, for example strategy, the structure of results, and threats.

### Mortensen

Like Zartman and Berman, Mortensen (1973:241) also refers to negotiation as a “meeting of personalities.” He too, upholds Argyle's social interaction techniques as good negotiator characteristics. These characteristics comprise a capacity for

intimacy, co-operation, but also competition, emotional empathy, communicativeness, tempo of interaction and domination.

## Karrass

Karrass (1970:53, 87, 93, 122) distinguishes three aspects of personality (identified through his experiments) that are significant in negotiation. The *achievement oriented* person takes realistic risks, approaches difficult situations with confidence, optimism and enthusiasm, is a problem solver, chooses specialists to help him in the pursuit of his goal, is patient, determined and competitive. He is inclined to talk shop at work, expects success and is open to feedback.

The behaviour of a negotiator under *stress*, is significant in determining his negotiating potential. If he can retain his patience, sense of humour and creativity, he will be successful. If, however, he becomes defensive or unrealistic, or withdraws, becomes aggressive, blames others, or becomes emotional, he will probably behave in the same way under similar conditions in future.

It is also important to know whether a person is predisposed to *learning, acceptance* and *change*. A person should, however, not be too easily swayed, otherwise he will eventually give up the pursuit of his own goal.

## Rubin and Brown

Rubin and Brown's (1975:233-262) premise is that the interpersonal orientation (IO) of a person has an influence on his negotiating behaviour. It is possible to manipulate IO, at least indirectly, in various ways. The communication can be manipulated for example by varying the type and amount of interpersonal information made available to a party. This will influence IO, which in turn will influence the quality of the negotiation. According to Rubin and Brown, IO is predominantly concerned with the degree of a person's responsiveness. If he

is not responsive, he stands to gain much in the negotiating situation due to the deliberateness of his behaviour. Responsive people are more co-operative and therefore expect positive results. The personality type should therefore be determined first to obtain the best results in negotiation.

## Summary

Different authors consider different personality traits important to a good or successful negotiator. In contrast to the viewpoint that specific characteristics make a successful negotiator, there is the latest school of thought on the personality of successful negotiators. This school of thought has developed from research on leadership qualities. Authoritarianism (Rubin, Brown 1975: 186-187) and Machiavellism (Rubin, Brown 1975: 189-191 and Tubbs, Moss 1974: 67) are no longer acceptable as leadership types, and a specific set of characteristics is also no longer acceptable in all situations. According to this latest view, specific characteristics, which would ensure a negotiator's success in all situations, do not exist, but there is a nucleus of characteristics that vary from situation to situation (Pottas 1987). *The negotiator should therefore be selected and, if necessary, trained for a specific negotiating situation.*

Leaversuch (1983:5) for example does not consider the negotiator's personality, but his *flexibility* in a situation, to be conclusive. "The Bible tells us that for all things there is a season. For negotiations, there is a time to bargain forcefully, fight, and win. There is also a time to harmonize and heal . . ."

Archibald (1971:8) maintains that a negotiator does not necessarily have to be a specialist in negotiating, but that he should have the general ability to *communicate effectively*.

It is therefore evident that a negotiator should possess a few core characteristics such as communication skills, adaptability, perceptivity, integrity and motivation, but that the other abilities are specific to the situation.

This conclusion holds many implications for the selection of negotiators. They could be selected not only by virtue of certain characteristics, but mainly for the specific negotiating situation.

Although research has focused on specific personality traits, the literature nevertheless shows that promising research on successful negotiating behaviour and on personality styles has been conducted.

## **Behaviour of successful negotiators**

Neil Rackham, managing director and prominent international consultant and researcher into negotiation, has conducted a number of studies at the Huthwaite Research Group since 1968. He makes use of behaviour analytical methods (1979:7) in his research. Rackham's technique involves direct observation during actual negotiation situations, to gather objective and quantifiable data on the behaviour of successful negotiators.

A prominent problem in negotiation research is the definition of the concept "successful." Rackham also encounters this problem in his research, as is evident from the following observation: "there is not much agreement among the experts on what "negotiation" means – let alone a commonly agreed definition of a skilled negotiator."

He lays down the following three criteria for *successful* negotiation:

- (a) the negotiators must be considered successful by both parties;
- (b) they must show a record of significant successes over a long period; and
- (c) they must have a low incidence of implementation failures.

For his research Rackham chose 49 successful negotiators who satisfied these criteria from 103 negotiating sessions. A control group was assembled from negotiators who did not satisfy

all the criteria, or about whom there were not sufficient data available.

After 56 planning and goal setting sessions with the experimental group and 37 sessions with the control group, the researchers gathered data from actual negotiating situations with the aid of notes and sound recordings.

The findings, measured during face-to-face negotiating behaviour, were as follows:

**Table 2**


<b>SUMMARY OF RACKHAM'S FINDINGS</b>		
<i>Frequency of behaviour displayed per hour</i>	<i>Successful Negotiators</i>	<i>Control Group</i>
1. Irritating remarks	2,3	10,8
2. Counter proposals	1,7	3,1
3. Aggressive	1,9	6,3
4. Reasons to substantiate statements	1,8	3,0
5. Prediction of behaviour	6,4	1,2
6. Testing for understanding and recapitulations	17,2	8,3
7. Search for information	21,3	9,6
8. Information on emotions	12,1	7,8

Rackham and the Huthwaite Research Group have not only contributed to the information on negotiating behaviour, but above all, demonstrated a sound research method and indeed in the actual situation – a rare event in negotiation research.

Behaviour, such as questions, negotiating techniques, and goal setting still needs to be examined.

Figure 13

HALL'S MODEL OF DEALING WITH CONFLICT



## Personality styles in negotiation


Hall (1971), Cummings (1972), Berne (1964), Harris (1967), and Filley (1975) were major contributors to our knowledge of negotiation personality styles.

Hall (1971):51-53) deducted personality styles from his model of dealing with conflict as illustrated in Figure 13.

Depending on whether a negotiator considers the negotiating relationship or his own aims the most important, he will, according to Hall, exhibit the following conflict resolution styles.

**Figure 14**

### HALL'S NEGOTIATING STYLES




Cummings (1972-67-84) identified negotiating styles such as the “tough bargainer”, the “soft bargainer”, and the “equalizer.”

Filley’s (1975:53) personality dimensions are four dichotomies, namely:

- placatory versus rebellious
- risk evasive versus risk taking
- external control versus internal control
- suspicious versus trusting.

Berne (1964) and Harris’s (1967) personality-ego-statuses, as described in their works on transactional analysis, are the Parent (P), Adult (A) and Child (C). These statuses can interact with one another in various ways (Berne 1964: 31):

**Figure 15**  
**INTERACTION PATTERNS OF**  
**PERSONALITY – EGO – STATUSES**



From the above contributions Filley compiled three negotiating personality styles. The *first style* is the “tough battler/bargainer” (9, 1), or the Parent. This negotiator has high internal control, is willing to run risks, is rebellious and will do everything to win the negotiation and to protect his own ego.

The *second style* is the “soft bargainer” or “friendly helper” (1, 9) who concedes and helps. He looks for acceptance and affiliation with others and will want to hang on to the relationship at the expense of his own goals. A high external control is present in this case and conflict cannot be resolved with mutual respect and understanding, as he is inclined to fantasizing and emotional instability.

The *third style* is the “equaliser” or “problem solver” (9, 9). This is the dominant style for problem management and negotiation. This negotiator believes that the parties’ objectives are not mutually exclusive and tries to maintain a sound negotiating relationship. He acknowledges the reality of facts and feelings as an essential ingredient in the solution of the problem. High internal control, dependable behaviour, reconciliation, and low risk seeking are characteristics of this negotiating style.

Zand (1972) considers the exposure of facts and feelings a harmful characteristic of any negotiating style; he maintains that such a person would be susceptible to proposals,

The best negotiating style would probably be an interaction of the three styles, or the employment of different styles, as the situation demands.

## **ATTITUDES**

In the literature that was studied, attitudes are defined in the following ways: Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), “. . . predisposition to evaluative response”; Sarnoff, (1960), “. . . a disposition to act favourably or unfavourably; Staats (1965), “. . . attitudes-reinforcer-discriminator system”, O’Keefe (1980), “. . . evaluative responses.”

In these definitions an *affective*, *cognitive* and *behavioural* component could be distinguished. Attitudes can therefore be defined as *relatively stable, acquired tendencies to react to something in a certain way*.

According to Bostrom (1983:53), change in attitude occurs with difficulty owing to the affective component contained in attitudes.

Eric Berne (1972:25) also maintains that change in attitude is difficult as a person's "life-script" has already been established between three and seven years of age and this determines attitude, Therefore a person will be a "consistent winner" or a "frequent loser", as a result of his attitude.

When attitudinal changes do take place, it may sometimes be dramatic, sometimes gradual, depending on the catalyst. It is difficult to know *how much* change has taken place owing to the nature of attitudinal change.

People enter into a negotiating situation with different attitudes, as a result of different cognitive, affective, and behavioural components. In the process, attitudes are also formed regarding other participants and specific issues that appear on the agenda. Reaching an agreement often depends on change in attitude, which takes place with difficulty. It is to the negotiators's advantage to be aware of the other party's attitudes, but even if he does obtain information about their persuasions, emotions, feelings and conduct tendencies, it still does not mean that it is possible to predict *behaviour*.

To take a standpoint in negotiation and to be committed to it, depend on attitudes (Clarke 1977: 110), The forcefulness of the standpoint will correspondingly reinforce the attitude. "The longer one argues in favour of a position the harder it becomes to change that position. Thus, one key to successful negotiation probably should be avoiding commitment to issues except to those most central to one's position . . ." (Schneider 1976: 381). If one would like to change an attitude, one should avoid arguing about it.

Factors that play a role in attitudinal change in negotiations are credibility, the pre-negotiation standpoint, self confidence, reward, new information and self-image (Clarke 1977:112).

In order to affect a change of attitude in negotiation, it is necessary to help the party to take a cognisant standpoint. Once a standpoint has been taken and expressed, it is easier to establish the affective and behavioural components. "To the extent that we express new beliefs and attitudes that we have acquired, we make a public commitment to those beliefs and attitudes. Research suggests that the more publicly we are committed to something, the less likely we are to change it . . ." (McCroskey, Wheelless 1976:51).

To establish a new attitude it is necessary to expose the person to counter arguments. He will then be inclined to reject information which contains these counter arguments, as well as new arguments. This technique of attitudinal modification is called "Counter Attitudinal Advocacy (CAA)." In 1980, Ruth McCarthy and Betty Williams were awarded the Nobel prize for using the technique in Ulster (USA) to promote mixed schooling among black and white children (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:38).

The CAA technique was developed by Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969) and consists of 5 steps, namely:

- (a) get the person to present CAA to a receptive audience;
- (b) it must be done in public or in a group;
- (c) it must occur repeatedly;
- (d) it must be assigned a social reward, such as applause or agreement; and
- (e) repeat steps one to four with a group of an opposing standpoint.

Attitudinal negotiation is therefore a process through which a mutually acceptable or functional relationship is developed, within which negotiation is possible (Karass 1970: 66).

## **VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION**

Communication, whether verbal or non-verbal, is an essential prerequisite for negotiation. Negotiation cannot take place without it.

In the literature that was studied, scant research on the role of communication in negotiation was found.

That which was found, and research that was not conducted in the negotiating situation itself but which is relevant to an understanding of the role of communication in negotiation, are discussed in this section.

### **Verbal versus non-verbal communication**

The communication of information is not restricted to verbal channels. Considerable human science research has already demonstrated that non-verbal communication plays an important role in influencing social interaction, and negotiation is no exception (Rubin, Brown 1975:98). Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982:20) found, for example, that non-verbal communication has a more profound influence on behaviour than verbal statements.

Hinde (1972), in an analysis of research in the field, found that emotions and attitudes are often communicated non-verbally by means of head nods, gesticulations, posture, facial expressions and eye contact. Thus, a superior attitude will be reflected by an erect posture, unfriendly and haughty facial expression, while fear is communicated by a tense, rigid attitude and a wringing of hands.

The best communication results, however, are achieved by employing both verbal and non-verbal communication. Wichman (1970) conducted a survey where people were in total isolation (they could neither see nor hear each other); could hear but not see each other (and vice versa); and could see and hear each other. The results demonstrate that the greatest co-operation

(87%) occurred among the people who could see and hear each other and the least (41%) among those who were isolated. Where they could only see, the co-operation was 48% and where they could only hear, 72%.

Vitz and Kite's (1970) experiments on variation in the type and amount of non-verbal communication among negotiators, indicate that written messages result in less effective negotiation communication than spoken communication.

Kleinke and Pohlen (1971) examined the effect of the communicator's command of non-verbal communication by studying the responses to different forms of behaviour. They tested the influence of strategy and staring at an opponent in 100% co-operative, 90% co-operative, and 100% competitive situations. Their first hypothesis, namely that co-operation leads to more favourable evaluation and affinity than competition does, was confirmed. Their second hypothesis, namely that being stared at will cause people to be inclined towards less favourable evaluation and affectivity towards the person in competitive than in co-operative circumstances, was rejected. The taboo on verbal communication and the irritation of being stared at, was probably the cause of the unfavourable evaluations in both the co-operative and competitive circumstances. This study demonstrated that strategic behaviour is more important than staring at, or avoiding eye contact with the other party.

### **Latent and manifest communication**

"The reality of the other person is not in what he reveals to you, but in what he cannot reveal to you. Therefore, if you would understand him, listen not to what he says but rather to what he does not say." Kahlil Gibran.

In human interactions, these words are never as true as in negotiating communication. Negotiators often conceal information, as information in this process is a form of power. Sometimes, the negotiator himself is unaware of the information that he imparts by means of non-verbal communication, for example, a nervous wringing of the hands.

The more the negotiator knows about latent information and the better he can perceive it, the greater are his chances for success.

## Functions of non-verbal communication

Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982:19-20) relate specific non-verbal behaviour to five functions of non-verbal behaviour:

- (a) indication of pre-articulated feelings;
- (b) indication information assimilation activities;
- (c) emphasizing persuasive claims;
- (d) facilitation of deception and concealment of information;  
and
- (e) conveying subtle messages.

According to the author's findings, non-verbal channels are indicators of the following information assimilation and management activities:

### Assimilation activities

- (a) *Paralinguistic* behaviour, such as blank pauses, is a sign of the information assimilation process;
- (b) certain *micro facial expressions* demonstrate the indexing of processes that are equal to neurophysiological changes;
- (c) *body movements* play a role in the process of speech encoding (a preliminary phase to information assimilation);
- (d) *visual* non-verbal behaviour, such as pupil responses, is an indicator of cognitive activities preceding decision taking.

### Management activities

- (a) *speech volume and tempo* enhance or prevent the conveyance of impressions or feelings;

- (b) controlling *facial expressions* aids persuasion and facilitates perceptual breakthrough.
- (c) *body movements*, which give the impression of credibility, empathy and attention, heighten the persuasion chances, while discomfort and fear reveal intentions to mislead.
- (d) *eye contact* and the *intimacy* that people have in interaction determine the length of gazing in communication. This, however, varies according to the context of different situations and with the distance between people.

The connection between different types of non-verbal behaviour is illustrated as follows by Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982: 35):

**Figure 16**

**STAGES OF INFORMATION ASSIMILATION AND  
NON-VERBAL BEHAVIOUR**

Information-seeking	Paralanguage	Higher duration of utterances, faster reaction-time latency, more speech interruptions
	Visual	More frequent gazes in the direction of the other actor
	Proxemic	Shorter spacial distance in standing or seating arrangement
Pre-articulation processing	Paralanguage	More frequent head nods and chin thrusts, more expansive hand and feet movements, larger postural shifts
	Visual	Larger pupil size, increased eye-blinking
Reactions/response selection	Paralanguage	Reduced verbalizations
	Facial	Raised brows, eyelids opened wider, dropped jaw
	Visual	Increased pupil size, change in eye contact

The literature studied gives rise to six findings regarding the connection between types of non-verbal behaviour, namely:

- (a) the relative effect of different channels;
- (b) the interactive effect of different behaviour;
- (c) the manifold indicators of intentions;
- (d) that multiple non-verbal indicators give a better evaluation of the psychological condition of a person than single channel indicators;
- (e) each of the three stages of information assimilation can be identified by non-verbal behaviour; and
- (f) the impressions in one channel can be reinforced or brought about by observing behaviour in another channel.

## **Culture**

The use of personal space, in cross cultural context in particular, was examined. Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982:21) found that the preference for spatial arrangement, distance, posture, touch and architectural design differs among cultures. People from different cultures interpret behaviour such as proximity, eye contact during conversations, touch, and furniture arrangement differently.

A knowledge of the other party's cultural preferences in nonverbal negotiating behaviour enhances good impressions; otherwise isolation and rejection may set in.

## **Research requirements**

There are considerable dimensions of verbal and non-verbal communication that have not yet been examined and that could contribute to an understanding of, and more effective, negotiation communication.

Aspects of communication that have not yet been thoroughly examined but are enjoying some attention are:

- (a) the role of questions in negotiation (Adler, Rodman 1982:210);
- (b) verbal openness (Chelune 1979:28);
- (c) ritual confirmation of agreements – especially among African nations (Gulliver 1979:113);
- (d) the use of information as a rare resource to build power (Roloff 1981:21 and Karrass 1970:61, 154);
- (e) the role of communication in conflict situations (Rubin, Brown 1975:95); and
- (f) deadlocks in negotiation as a result of the lack of communication (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:19).

Three aspects of non-verbal communication that enjoy a great deal of attention in practice where there is a need for research are:

- (a) the Zeigarnik effect – incompleting action is remembered far longer than completed action;
- (b) the Wolf effect – as long as the negotiator asks questions, he is in control of the situation; and
- (c) the influence of different aspects of body language on a negotiating decision; for example proximity, kinesics and touch.

## Summary

Verbal and non-verbal communication is probably the most important element in the negotiating process. Not only does it influence the process and individuals involved in it, but it is also the conveyor of the other elements. Without communication it is not possible to resolve conflict, build power, establish position and achieve goals.

Non-verbal behaviour is, however, an area of human interaction which is sufficiently deliberate to complicate prediction.

George Kelly (1969) observes that, “one of a person’s human problems in social interaction is that of distinguishing winks from blinks – the tactical from the benign.” More research is necessary to comprehend this problematic but key element of negotiation.

## **ACTIVE LISTENING**

“Mutual understanding is a result of maximal communication through mutual empathy” Joost A. M. Meerlo (in Gordon, 1969:1).

Without understanding for the other party’s case, negotiation is impossible. If each party is only concerned about his own gain and does not consider the costs to the other party, the chances of reaching an agreement are minimal. Understanding only arises from maximal utilisation of effective verbal and non-verbal communication (Goldstein, Sies 1974:20). Empathy grows from the utilisation of communication.

Active listening is the empathic receiving of a message, but especially the latent or concealed message. Active listening consists of hearing the total communication message, paying attention to it, forming an understanding of it, and remembering it (Adler, Rodman 1982:92-93). It is also the willingness to defer criticism and judgment, until more information is available (Tubbs, Moss 1974:140).

Often, responsiveness has no part in negotiation, as a result of message overload, pre-occupied participants, physical interferences, too much talking, or because it has never been mastered, but particularly, because the tempo of intra- and inter-personal communication is very fast and misunderstanding causes erroneous assumptions.

Responsiveness is an important element in the negotiating process and is one of the elements which suffers the most neglect.

## MESSAGE CONTENT

The message content, or the meaning of the message is determined by the negotiators' personalities, roles, cultures, experience, attitudes, and other negotiating elements. The form of the message (such as rules of behaviour laid down for the negotiation), and the structure of the negotiation (whether it is direct, indirect, individual, group or public negotiation) also determine the meaning of the message. An important factor in determining the message content is the negotiating situation itself.

The message is expressed or transmitted in a negotiating situation. This not only influences its meaning, but is often the determining factor. A party may for example state that he now wants to make a final negotiating offer, but in fact, he means that he wants to know the other party's commitment. Edward T. Hall (1959) calls this assignment of meaning in the negotiating situation "The Silent Language" and Karrass (1970: 195) refers to it as "the hidden meaning." Other authors refer to the need for meta-communication (communication about communication) as a result of the latent message content which is very prominent in the negotiating situation. The hidden message content and the goals necessitate meta-communication, which again helps to determine the situation.

Ways in which to clarify the message content is to ask questions – correctly formulated (Cavanaugh 1983:7). It is essential that constantly, throughout the negotiating process, one's own party and the other party are completely clear about the meaning of the message. This prevents unnecessary conflict and is especially required when the parties are from different cultural and population groups. The perception of the message content can easily differ under these circumstances.

### **Symbolic message content**

Positive negotiating results depend on the commonality of the meaning of the message content. The meaning ascribed to communication signs and symbols can only be shared through

communication. According to Druckman (1973:28), the possibility of agreement or sharing of meaning is enhanced when face-to-face communication is increased.

A sound relationship can contribute to the commonality of meaning. According to Roloff (1981:30), communication is “a symbolic process by which two people bound together in a relationship, provide each other with resources or negotiate the exchange of resources.” The exchange of information or resources in the negotiating relationship is a symbolic process, where the relationship promotes the sharing of information. It is therefore important to maintain a sound working relationship, in order to limit the possibility of misunderstandings about the meaning of the message content.

Communication is an essential negotiating instrument. Symbolisation will therefore also play a large role in negotiation. According to Crable (1979:19 and 88), symbolisation is one of the phases of communication, and it has direct influence on the meaning of the message that the negotiator communicates or the other party decodes, as illustrated in Figure 17.


In a negotiating situation, the structure and participants' attitudes are often not conducive to a sound relationship. The climate should therefore be made favourable, before the negotiation can actually begin in order to make optimum sharing of meaning possible – see Cosmit (1986) on pre-negotiation intercultural communication in South Africa.

The way in which negotiation takes place, namely in such a way that the rationale behind the decision is clear, influences the results. This promotes the sharing of meaning. “The way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated,” Henry Kissinger (in Zartman, Berman 1982:165).

The method that so far has produced the best results in measuring the effectiveness of a message is Robert F. Bales's interactional process analysis. This method has been fully discussed in chapter 4.

Figure 17

### SYMBOLISATION AS PHASE IN THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS



### CHANNELS

A communications channel is the route along which, or the mechanism whereby information is transmitted from a source to a destination.

A channel may therefore be a mechanism, a medium or a route. In a negotiating situation, the channel as *mechanism* or *medium* is usually language – sometimes directly, or alternatively, by way of translators. According to DeVito (1978:11), the channel in face-to-face communication may be any sensory form, “In fact, everything about us communicates.”

The channel can also be the written word, as in the case of indirect negotiation. A mass medium may be used as a communication channel in negotiation, but especially as power building medium, or for strategic reasons.

The channel can also be the *route* of information transmission – see Katz and Kahn's 1973, "Communication the flow of information." In negotiation the route of the information flow is determined by the structure of the negotiating situation.

In interpersonal relations, the structure is usually a dyad, while in international negotiations, it may be individual-to-individual, individual-to-group, or group-to-group. The structure in most negotiations is usually group-to-group. Each negotiating structure holds certain implications for the negotiating channel and message.

According to Clarke (1977:59), the negotiating structure comprises the patterns of interpersonal relations that influence the negotiating process. The negotiating structure influences, and is influenced by, the negotiating situation (the type of conflict, the physical set up); the negotiator's function and position; the relationships that exist between the parties; and the type of agreement that needs to be reached (legal, contractual).

Zartman and Berman (1982:199-224) added aspects such as the size and strength of the team, the influence of the perception of "the folks back home" on the negotiation, prominence of channels, and the cultural context.

Negotiating structure, (who negotiates with whom?) is one of the most important issues in negotiation (Bairstow, 1980:514).

## **Dyads**

A dyad is interpersonal interaction which occurs between two people, where the communication content, the intimacy of the relationship and the time lapse before feedback, are determining factors. A dyad usually arises when agreement, a fulfilment of needs, exchange of social resources, emotional investment and closeness are required.

Dyadic communication is therefore face-to-face communication, which can occur between two spouses, friends, blood-relations, business partners, or strangers.

If the negotiating structure takes the form of a dyad, it has a certain influence on the process:

- (a) a relationship is easily formed, which facilitates the resolution of conflict. There are no other individuals to complicate decision taking and the relationship is usually personal or intimate.
- (b) communication can be more effective as a result of direct communication and familiarity with the sender.
- (c) there is greater commitment to the agreement due to shared responsibility and more than one person's perception.
- (d) it is easy to identify tasks, and socio-emotional needs can be met.

When the individuals who are involved have different goals, however, or there is conflict between them, which prevents a working relationship, it is very difficult or impossible to reach an agreement in a negotiation that is dyadic in structure. The potential for finding alternative solutions is also more limited than in a group-to-group negotiating structure.


### **Individual-to-group**

Pienaar and Robinson (1983:2) linked the type and the strategy of negotiation to the structure of the negotiation.

As illustrated in Figure 18, negotiation that takes place between an individual and a group on a direct and continued (sustained) basis, would focus on the negotiation strategy rather than the process. The strategy and factors of the negotiation (such as time fixing, agenda setting, communication and media use) are of great significance in this situation and not the processes such as persuasion, influence and attitude shift. The individual cannot afford to attempt these against a group.

Figure 18

**STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES OF NEGOTIATION**



Individual-to-group negotiation, however, is very risky and is seldom used nowadays, because a team has greater access to resources, greater power and more manipulative potential than an individual.

**Group-to-group**

Group-to-group is the most common form of negotiation. It is used so often that negotiation may be seen as a group communication process. The influence of this structure on the negotiating process and results is better understood when the nature and function of groups and group communication are examined.

A group forms when the face-to-face interaction of two or more people occurs in such a way that members of the group can accurately recall the characteristics of every other member (Burgoon, Heston, McCroskey 1974:2). The most important *characteristics* of a group are therefore the proximity of the group (face-to-face), the fact that interaction takes place, the number of people involved (two or more, but not too many for interaction), and the fact that members must be able to describe the other participants' characteristics accurately.

These characteristics of groups correspond, while groups differ with regard to their structure and function. The *structure* of a group is determined by the relative position of the members to each other, their roles and their status (the prestige connected to the position) (Marais 1979:88-89). The structure of a group is always unique; thus peculiar only to the group. Aspects that contribute to the uniqueness of a group's structure are the way in which roles are interpreted, the unique communication network that develops, the individual contributions by each member, the norms of the group, the frequency of interaction, the group personality, and the goals of the members of the group (Burgoon, Heston, McCroskey 1974:2-6; Leth, Vandemark 1977:53).

It is precisely the goals of groups that cause their *functions* to differ. The functions of groups can be divided into predominantly two broad types, namely task oriented and socio-emotionally oriented goals.

Within these two broad categories, Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974:11) also identify specific classifications of a group's functions such as therapy, relationships, persuasion, conflict resolution and problem solving as illustrated in Figure 19.

Apart from the group's functions, individual group members also have a specific function in negotiation. There are four important team functions that the members have to carry out, namely:


- (a) socio-emotional leadership;
- (b) task oriented leadership;
- (c) keeping record; and
- (d) analysis of the process.

It is important that group or team members are selected carefully to carry out these functions and to complement each other.

As the predominant goal of negotiation is problem solving, according to the definition in chapter two, we will look at this

Figure 19

### SMALL GROUP FUNCTIONS



group function in particular. It is accepted however that other group functions such as influence, development of affinity, and orientation are also carried out by the group during negotiation (Cavanaugh 1983:2).

The question arises why the group structure in particular is used for problem solving. Some authors are of the opinion that groups

are unwieldy rather than being of any value. Adler and Rodman (1982:249-267) however state various reasons why groups are suitable for problem solving.

## Resources

For most problem solving tasks, a group has greater access to resources than most individuals. Not only are they better equipped physically (which is an important aspect of negotiation according to Zartman and Berman 1982:64), but they can also usually find a better solution. Available resources can be utilised more effectively due to the group's interaction.

## Accuracy

Another advantage of a group is that members have a better chance to intercept mistakes. No one is without faults, and in negotiation a mistake can cost human lives. Sometimes a mistake is not so obvious, which makes a team effort even more valuable, as there are more members who might be in a position to spot it.

## Commitment

Apart from effective solutions, a group structure usually leads to greater commitment to the execution of decisions; especially if members share in the decision taking. This phenomenon is known as the principle of *participatory decision* taking, which is now also applied in South African organisations (De Villiers 1975:5) and which leads to greater emphasis on negotiation at all levels.

At almost every phase of problem solving, a group is more effective than an individual; also in the identification and analysis of problems. It is however especially in the development and evaluation of alternative solutions (which can make or break negotiations) where a group has greater potential and therefore achieves better results.

Pienaar and Robinson (1983:29) maintain that the dynamics of how the group functions lead to successful negotiation. They divide group function into five phases:

- (a) the socio-emotional phase – where a leader establishes the climate as well as the norms whereby the group functions;
- (b) the problem defining phase – the problem is defined and group cohesion is built;
- (c) The political phase – roles, rules, power and authority are discussed; a task leader emerges or is appointed by virtue of his ability;
- (d) the constructive phase – the problem is dealt with constructively, the task leader, and not the socio-emotional leader, is very active;
- (e) A final socio-emotional phase – conclusion takes place; the socio-emotional leader plays the dominant role and creates a climate to resume or implement the negotiation.

A smaller group provides a better chance to obtain a compromise than a large group who is more inclined to take judgmental decisions.

The limitations of the group as negotiating structure should also be pointed out.

#### Absence of critical information

It is essential to ensure that the negotiating team has been assembled correctly, so that all the necessary information is available or accessible. A group can easily assume that they have all the information, when this is not always the case.

#### Domination by a minority

Unequal participation by group members diminishes the effectiveness of a group. The quantity of a member's contribution

does not necessarily determine its quality. It is the duty of the leader of the team to consider all ideas before taking a decision.

### Pressure to conform

No individual should be a member of a negotiating team if he has no confidence in his problem solving abilities. If a member shows potential, but is hesitant, it is up to the leader to encourage the member or to omit him from the team.

### Premature decision taking

During the first phase (the socio-emotional phase) of the negotiating process, it is easy to become emotionally involved with a problem. It is therefore essential that the members never lose sight of their goals and negotiating strategies, so that rash decisions are not taken before the task oriented phase.

Problem solving is not possible without communication in the group or team. Communication in small groups will therefore be examined next.

**Small group communication** is a study field in its own right and cannot be discussed fully in this survey. Only the unique characteristics of small group communication, and its role in negotiation will be referred to.

Small group communication can be distinguished from dyadic and group-to-individual communication on the base of the goals, structure and functions that have already been discussed. Other aspects of small groups that are also unique are the complexity, the withdrawal ability, and the ability to influence (Marais 1979:23-24).

### Complexity

There are not only one receiver and one communicator in a group. The communicator must consider more than one receiver when coding his message. In negotiation, receivers outside the immediate situation should also be kept in mind.

## Withdrawal

The dynamic combination of a group sometimes facilitates and sometimes complicates withdrawal by a member. Specific role expectations exist, making it difficult or easy for members to withdraw. In a negotiating situation, the withdrawal of a team member can have drastic results, for example, forfeiting the other team's trust.

## Influence

Recent research on various communication areas (for example the communication of development innovations by small groups) indicates the strong power of influence that this negotiating structure has.

The influence and intimacy that result from group cohesion are unique to the small group. This power of influence makes the small group unique.

## Public dimension

Negotiation visibility has an influence on negotiation behaviour. (Clarke 1977:22). The structure of the negotiation is influenced by visibility, whether as a result of an audience being present, or by means of reporting by, or communication to, mass media. According to Marais (1979:129), mass media reporting has the same effect as the presence of an audience – especially psychological.

The most important influence of a public dimension on the negotiating structure is the tendency displayed by negotiators to impress the audience, and the pressure that the audience reaction subsequently puts on the negotiator. During the Falkland War, Jean Kirkpatrick's press releases succeeded in confusing Mrs Thatcher rather than helping her to establish America's standpoint. President Sadat's exposure of his visit to Israel, on the other hand, contributed to a positive attitude on the part of

the Israeli government and therefore to the success of the negotiation.

## **Organisational negotiating structures**

The negotiating structures in organisations and between organisations are closely linked to the management ideology of the organisation(s). The traditional, autocratic (better known as the Machiavellian) management ideology, makes no provision for negotiating structures. Bad communication and too few channels, have led to inefficiency and the setting of win-lose ultimatums between trade unions and employers (De Swardt 1979:11).

Management ideologies however are gradually being changed to more decentralised control as a result of the socialist inspired emphasis that is placed on quality of life. Workers are now able to participate more in decision making, structures of authority are beginning to change, and industrial democracy is once more part of the scene (De Villiers 1975:5). The changed management ideology now places the emphasis on win-win (or integrative) negotiation. There is greater striving by both parties to co-operate as effectively as possible in order to obtain the best possible benefits for both parties through negotiation.

Although two parties may have the same management ideology, there nevertheless may be a difference in negotiating structure. The negotiation may be less or more formal. This affects the team compilation, available channels, the communication network or patterns, and the negotiating behaviour. The formality of the negotiating structure is often connected to cultural customs and recognition of the other party (Piron 1982). According to Bairstow's (1980) research on the structure of negotiations in various countries, a universal negotiating structure does not exist. "Pure categories such as totally centralised or totally decentralised types of bargaining are rare" (p 514). Thus, there are centralised and decentralised negotiating structures in the USA and the United Kingdom, while centralised structures predominantly occur in Japan and Sweden.

The form and place of centralisation differ however. It may for example be a central trade union, or a central employer.

Negotiation (better known as collective bargaining in industrial terms) is a trend that is on the increase in organisations throughout the world – irrespective of the management philosophy. De Villiers (1975:12) names as examples countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the USA, Canada, Holland, the West German Republic, France, Austria, Russia, the United Kingdom, even developing countries such as Nigeria, and the Philippines. The need for effective negotiating structures exists everywhere. In 1981, during its seventy-sixth session, the International Labour Office in Geneva, Switzerland called for a worldwide improvement of negotiating structures (p 4). What these structures should constitute, however, is not clear: “It had been clear at the end of the Committee’s work that there was no meeting of minds on this issue” (p 36).

In South Africa there is above all a need to provide for the lack of negotiating structures for black workers: “. . . should there be opportunity for participation by means of collective bargaining at organisational level for the non-white worker” (De Villiers 1975:15). At some organisations, however, appropriate structures are now created.

The Wiehahn Commission’s (Mannekrag 1982:1) request that communication channels between employers, employees, and the government should be kept free, is a plea for the creation of such negotiating structures.

## **Summary**

Negotiating channels are mechanisms or routes to transmit the negotiation message to the destination. Various elements of negotiation influence the choice and form of the channel,

of which the negotiating structure is the most prominent. Group-to-group is the most popular negotiating structure, and knowledge of its functioning is important for an understanding of the dynamics of the negotiating process. In Durkheim's (1964:110-111) words:

“The first origins of all social processes of any importance should be sought in the internal constitution of the social group, rather than in the psychology or physiology of the members.”

## GOAL SETTING

A negotiator must set goals to ensure that his message does in fact reach the right destination through the right channel (see Fourie's *Communication by Objectiveness* 1975). In a negotiating situation, where the results often involve vast amounts of money, relations between nations, or human lives, it is of cardinal importance that goals are set.

The general or broad goals of a negotiation can be as diverse as the creation of relations, establishing the other party's position or power base, reaching an agreement, and the gaining of time. Piron (1982:5) considers the establishment of a relationship the goal of negotiation. It is his opinion that this goal is often neglected for the sake of the legal aspects. According to Druckman (1973: 11), the most important objective in negotiation is to reach an agreement: “the purpose of negotiation is to resolve a disagreement between two or more parties.” The absolute minimum goal is that there is agreement on the necessity for negotiation.

Agreement does not have to be, and often is not, the goal of negotiation. Unfortunately, the goal is often to gain time before an action in order to have conditions that are more favourable, to distribute negative propaganda against another party, to make world opinion more favourable, or to shift the onus for a failure (Sawyer, Guetskow 1965:468). Negotiation can also be

used to plan independent action as in the case of Japan's negotiation with America. While America was negotiating with Japan for peace, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941.

The goals of the negotiation determine which type of negotiation the negotiator is dealing with. According to Atkinson (1980: 26), there are four types of negotiation based on the goals, namely:

- (a) dealing with grievances;
- (b) giving advice;
- (c) group problem solving; and
- (d) bargaining.

If, for example, the purpose of the negotiation is to reconcile the aspirations of the organisation and the employee, it would be advisory negotiation.

Goal settling is also necessary to obtain co-operation in a negotiating team. Each team member should have a specific role to play in order to obtain the common goal. The setting of goals also motivates the party to participate and to persevere in the negotiating process. According to Thucyclides' words to the Spartans, commonality of goals is " . . . the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals" (Sawyer, Guetskow 1965:469).

The most important objective of the setting of *specific goals* is to determine negotiating techniques. In his *Collective Bargaining by Objectives*, Richardson (1977:107) demonstrates how negotiation is planned, techniques are established, and results are evaluated according to goals – illustrated in Figure 20.

Negotiation should never occur until specific goals have been formulated carefully. Nevertheless, although goals have been carefully planned, the negotiation may still fail if the parties' goals are incompatible, while the parties remain inflexible. Negotiation should therefore always be considered a learning process, where each party has to learn something from the other as well as from the process.

**Figure 20**

**NEGOTIATION BY OBJECTIVES**

A GUIDELINE FOR DATA PREPARATION, STRATEGY DEFINITION  
AND THE EVALUATION OF NEGOTIATING RESULTS

Bargaining * items	Priorities **	Range of bargaining objectives			Initial *** Bargaining Position	Evaluation Results		
		Pessimistic	Realistic	Optimistic		P	R	O

\* Classify items in Two Groups, Financial and Non-financial  
\*\* Relative Priority of each Bargaining Item to all Bargaining Items  
\*\*\* Actual Visible Position taken 1<sup>st</sup> Opening of Negotiation (Union Initial Proposal of Company Response of Counter Offer.)

**EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING**

“. negotiators are made not born...” (Zartman, Berman 1982: 16).

How are negotiators made? By *learning* negotiators can acquire certain required knowledge, but it is only through experience (by participating in negotiations under actual conditions) that a negotiator can develop the required skills. People have different ways of learning and apply the principles they learn differently. Learning and experience however help negotiators to negotiate more effectively.

Negotiation cannot succeed if the negotiators do not constantly learn from one another and the situation, and adjust their positions accordingly. Zartman and Berman (1982:158-159) refer specifically to the adjustment of a party's own action after having taken cognisance of the communication signals as revealed by personal as well as the other party's behaviour.

### What can a negotiator learn?

A negotiator should take cognisance of the *elements* that are present in negotiation and of how they *function*. This makes him more aware of the importance of, inter alia, non-verbal communication, perception, and empathy for the other party, which in turn lead to more successful negotiation. Besides knowledge and awareness of negotiating elements, the negotiator should also know how to recognise the negotiating process and how the other processes in the negotiating process function (for example influence, power building, and non-verbal communication manipulation). *Methods*, which should not only be learnt by the negotiator, but which he should experience in an actual situation to be able to apply them, include methods of attitudinal and opinion shift such as Bales's, which are discussed later in this chapter. Basic tactics and strategies to prevent the negotiation from ending in a deadlock, to avoid intimidation, or to make concessions that are too generous, can also be learnt.

A negotiator possesses various personality characteristics that he can develop, or new skills (such as needs identification) can be learnt.

Adjustment and change are essential in negotiation. An agreement will never be reached if none of the parties is amenable to it. "Change can only occur if a message is learned and accepted. The learning process involves hearing and understanding. A learner must have enough intelligence to learn and enough motivation to accept if his decision behaviour is to be changed" (Karrass 1970:86).

In South Africa, as in many other countries, all parties in the wide spectrum of negotiating situations, still have much to learn and even more to experience. This statement is corroborated by

Prof. N.E. Wiehahn in his, *The regulations of labour relations in a changing South Africa* and the International Labour Office (1981: 23) in Geneva. Dr W.J. de Villiers's authoritative opinion on this issue is that the non-white worker in particular should be exposed to training opportunities by way of participation in collective bargaining at the organisational level.

## ROLES

Status is a position, while a role is the way in which people expect a position to be filled. "A role is the normative regulated participation by a person in a concrete process of social interaction with specified concrete co-players." (Celliers, Joubert 1966: 33).


In the negotiating process, a role is not only regulated according to norms but is often explicitly spelled out or prescribed to a member of the negotiating team, for example, to be aggressive. That is why the two leadership roles in negotiation, often are not filled by the same person. The task oriented leader assumes the role of chief negotiator – he is often more aggressive and makes definite demands or proposals – while the socio-emotional leader has to promote goodwill and a sound negotiating relationship as well as co-ordinate the team efforts. These roles manifest in the interaction with the other participants in the process.

Variation in roles sometimes necessitates negotiation (Clarke 1977:115). "Rules and roles are always breaking down – and when they do not, they do not miraculously remain intact without some effort, including negotiating effort, to maintain them" (Strauss 1978:ix).

The negotiating process and elements in their turn contribute to the changing roles and role expectations. Karrass (1970: 110) illustrates in his model of roles that there are eight role senders that make demands on the negotiator (Figure 21).

Figure 21

MODEL OF NEGOTIATING ROLES



When they are not compatible, these role expectations obviously lead to conflict. Role conflict creates ambiguity and tension. A negotiator should therefore meet in certain expectations, modify others and ignore some. How he resolves them depends on his personality and his relationship with the different role senders.

Despite sound contributions to our comprehension of roles, such as the publications and experiments by Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, there is still limited knowledge of negotiating roles. There is however little doubt that the role of negotiator is fraught with conflict. He must reconcile the high demands of others in an acceptable, long term agreement. The demands are often made by people from different cultures, with different frames of reference.

## **CULTURE**

According to Tylor (in Johnson 1962:82), culture is “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals law, custom and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society.” Culture is therefore a complex system of elements (such as knowledge, beliefs, customs) that is learned by each member of society and that differs from society to society.

The function of culture is to ensure the integration and survival of society. “Culture is abstract in the sense that it is manifested in behaviour and in the results of behaviour but it is neither behaviour itself or the tangible results . . .” (Johnson 1962:82). Culture, therefore, provides the guidelines for behaviour – including negotiating behaviour.

There is no negotiation element which is not affected by culture. Nevertheless, scant research has been conducted on the influence of culture on the negotiating process.

Zartman and Berman (1982:224) ask two crucial questions about the role of culture in negotiation: “Do people from different cultures have a different conception of the function of negotiation? Do they negotiate differently?”

Inter-cultural communication literature as well as anthropological literature throw light on these questions.

Van Aswegen (1983) identifies cultural factors which have an influence on intercultural communication and therefore also communication in negotiation. These factors include perception,

philosophy, values, beliefs, attitudes (which include stereotypes, prejudice and ethnocentrism), roles, the time concept, language, and non-verbal communication. These factors also influence intercultural negotiation.

## **Perception**

Perception in intercultural situations occur selectively as a result of prejudices, stereotypes, and a difference in the connotative meaning assigned to concepts. Davis and Triandis (1965) found, for example, in an investigation of world perceptions more than 100 operational definitions of attitude and personality scales in studies among different cultures.

As perception plays a significant role in the negotiating process and also influences beliefs, attitudes, values, and especially communication behaviour, it is essential that negotiators should be made aware of it.

## **Power, position, and inequality**

These factors have long since acquired cultural connotations. They are also closely linked to perception as previously discussed.

## **Attitudes**

In cultural context, attitudes are often expressed as *us* and *others*, and owing to prejudices, ethnocentrism and stereotyping, social distance is established. Attitudes develop from the parties' reference frameworks (which differ) and in turn influence perception and therefore communication and behaviour. According to Rich (1974:38), emotionally based attitudes lead to the selection of elements in the environment and the "rearrangement" of reality. An effective negotiator cannot allow his attitude to cause inaccurate perception and therefore ineffective negotiation.

## **Personality**

Personality is also influenced by culture, as it is partially formed by culture. Tubbs and Moss (1974:138) mention one particular stumbling block in intercultural communication, namely a high anxiety level. If, however, the atmosphere remains sympathetic, and the communication is accurate and effective, cultural differences should not create any problems regarding personality in negotiation.

## **Credibility**

Credibility can be a problem, depending on which cultures are involved in the negotiation. Members of certain cultures are more inclined to distrust each other in negotiation, for example, Americans and Russians, or white and black Americans. Such a situation often harbours built-in conflict. If the parties are from different cultures, there need not necessarily be conflict, but there is a great possibility that different attitudes, concepts of time, a difference in goals, and in particular, those negotiating tactics that are regarded as fair, would in fact lead to conflict.

## **Ritual confirmation**

The ritual confirmation of an agreement is firmly imbedded in the culture of traditional African negotiation in particular. In the past this was done by the ritual parading of their new acquisition, for example their wife or cattle (Gulliver 1979:163), while today it is usually accomplished by means of announcements to the mass media.

## **Code systems**

The most important verbal code system used by man in communication and interaction is language. In intercultural situations one of the biggest problems is a difference in language. Language is expressed in symbols, and they carry the meaning of the message. If the two parties' frames of reference regarding

the assignment of meaning and the system of symbols differ, there can be no sharing of meaning.


Authors such as Zartman and Berman (1982:226) and Mehraboan (1971:111) believe that there is a universal non-verbal communication code system. Others, such as Rich (1974:161) and Barnlund (1968:511), maintain that the cultural differences are so large that they overrule the resemblances. In Barnlund's words: "Differences of time and place, changes in dress, posture, or facial expression modify and sometimes totally override the literal meaning of a message."

### A model of intercultural interaction

In his model of intercultural interaction, Rich (1974:13) attempts to make a diagrammatic representation of all the cultural, social, economic, and ethnic variations that influence the interaction of individuals in a complex society.

Figure 22

### RICH'S MODEL FOR INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION



X Y and Z are different socio-economic classes.  
A and B are two different cultures, while  
C are people who have had extensive contact with the other  
cultures (A or B) – for example American negroes or urbanised  
South African blacks.  
1-4 are different cultural groups within a specific race.

## Negotiating patterns

Gulliver (1979) reports on several African tribes amongst whom he attended negotiating processes and dispute settlements. The negotiating patterns of the tribes differed. Some exclusively made use of a third party, while others negotiated directly, but in the presence of family members. Some of the tribes used mediators, while others had arbitrators, or a council of elders.

Negotiating patterns are influenced by group cohesion and are also determined by culture. Gulliver (1979:31) demonstrates how Jews in the USA, the Gonyaro in Uganda, and Chinese in America are prevented by group cohesion to fight against decisions. The decisions are however personal and informal.

Negotiations can occur *within* cultures or sub-cultures (intracultural negotiation), or between cultures (intercultural negotiation). Most of the studies in the examined literature mentioned surveys on research on the negotiating process within a specific culture. Karrass (1970:58-59) demonstrates, for example, how the lonely and vast Arctic conditions influence the Eskimo's negotiation with a trader at a trading post. Such information about negotiation in cultures should be of value in establishing how the members of that culture negotiate.

Research on negotiation between cultures, however, is not as prevalent in the literature, and is often a retrospective case study. As yet, no underlying fundamental differences or resemblances in negotiating principles have been exposed.


Druckman (1973:33-36), however, does point out the difference in negotiation between Americans and some other cultures. The Greeks regard an agreement between two positions or

standpoints a definite failure (Triandis, Davis 1965). The Arabs make considerably fewer compromises than the Americans (Summers, Stewart, Orcken 1968).

## Conclusion

Communication, especially non-verbal communication, is the best indicator of the difference that exists in meaning assignment between communicators of different cultures. According to Rich (1974:161), the “real self” is more easily exposed by non-verbal communication. Communication, is however, also the only

Figure 23



negotiating element that can bring about interaction. It is therefore by means of communication that differences should be resolved and agreements should be reached.

No member of one culture can become a member of another culture, as he can never share in the same experience. Through understanding, accurate perception, empathic responsiveness, and knowledge of the other culture and value systems, the perception of meaning may still be expanded and thus an agreement may be reached.

Zartman and Berman (1982:227-229) make a few suggestions how to facilitate intercultural negotiation:

- (a) Distinguish between cultural customs and individual eccentricity. Arabs and Russians for example are generally known as tough bargainers, while Qaddafi is labelled irrational and unreasonable:
- (b) It is essential to concur on clear negotiating rules, but not so strict that they hamper the communication.
- (c) Cognisance must be taken of cultural differences in negotiations that are the result of national differences. The Russians for example favour detail negotiation, while the Americans first want to gain acceptance for a packet, or formula before discussing the detail. These differences affect the choice of channels and strategies.

A negotiator can learn to deal with certain cultural differences, or at least to anticipate them; for example to negotiate late at night with Russia and China. Deeper differences, such as value structures, especially when they have been based on traditional beliefs of what is "fair", are far more difficult to cope with. It is possible, however, to clear misunderstandings and misconception by persevering in the communication.

In the light of the complexity of the multi cultural composition of South African society, it has become urgently necessary to conduct systematic scientific research on intercultural negotiations.

In Zartman and Berman's (1982:224) words: "there are still more questions than answers."

## **PROCESS, METHOD, STRATEGY AND TACTIC**

Negotiating communication is a process of interaction. Within the negotiating process there are specific methods of interaction, strategies, and tactics that can be used.

### **Process**

Not only is negotiation a process, but it also consists of many processes such as communication, influence, coalition forming, problem solving, power building, agenda setting, debating. Process in negotiation therefore refers to a direction, or a series of actions which is followed to obtain a specific goal – according to Druckman (1973:15): "all actions or communications, by any party to the negotiation, either made within the negotiation situation or intended to influence its outcome."

The process of, and the processes in negotiation, are dynamic. According to Gulliver (1979:80), each process has its own dynamics, which develop logically, and are maintained by the process. Interaction is sustained within the process by contradictions and variation, for example, conflict and difference in goals. The process of agenda setting or development is an example of this. The agenda is compiled from a list of issues that a party would like to discuss. Not all issues are placed on the agenda, because " . . . the choice of conflict allocates power" (Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965:469). There is, however, a hidden agenda for all issues that are important to a party, but which they do not want to bring up for immediate discussion. The order of the items on the agenda is considered to be of crucial importance by most authors, practitioners and researchers. A successful agenda setting technique is for example to place an issue that is less important to party A, but very important to party B first on the agenda. A concession on this point compels party B to make a concession on the next point (which is a very important point for

party A). The agenda has to be adjusted and modified constantly to adapt to the changed situation in the negotiating process. According to Riker (1962), the eighties is the “age of manoeuvre.”

A process is therefore a series of actions aimed at eventually reaching an agreement in the negotiation. Few researchers, however, have attempted to examine the total negotiation process.

## **Method**

The literature on negotiation makes no distinction between the definitions of the concept “method” and those of strategy or tactic. Method can therefore be interchanged with both strategy and tactic.

## **Strategies and tactics**


Negotiating strategies and tactics are actions, or communication by any party within, or outside of the negotiating situation that are intended to influence the results (Druckman 1973: 15). They are therefore part of the negotiating process.

Strategies and tactics can be distinguished by virtue of the type of goal that they want to achieve. Negotiating strategy is the overall planning aimed at obtaining long term goals or values and can consist of a series of tactics used during the negotiating process. Negotiating tactics constitute a method that is used, or a tactical manoeuvre that is carried out at a specific time in the negotiating process (Druckman 1977:13 and Karrass 1970: 149-150). This is exemplified by an integrative (win-win) or a distributive (win-lose) negotiating strategy. Techniques that may help a negotiator to follow an integrative strategy are for example Bales’s tactic of opinion shift, and the tactic of behavioural commitment (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:38).

Bales’s interactional matrix for opinion change consists of twelve steps which are followed in a particular order.

Figure 24

BALES'S INTERACTIONAL MATRIX



Steps 1 to 9, followed in sequence, lead to a change in opinion. This process can also be followed from step 12 to 1 to obtain the co-operation of an aggressive opponent.

Note that in a team context steps 1-3 are dealt with by the socio-emotional leader and steps 4-6 by the task oriented leader.

The tactic of behavioural commitment (illustrated in Figure 25) consists of ten steps, used in a specific order, with or without pauses between steps.

This tactic is aimed at obtaining obligatory behaviour from a negotiator in order to have more certainty about the successful implementation of the agreement.

Figure 25

**TECHNIQUE OF BEHAVIOURAL COMMITMENT**

Step 1	–	Can you explain it?
Step 2	–	<i>Wait for response.</i>
Step 3	–	Thus, it is your opinion. . . .(repeat, interpret, reflect on what has been said)
Step 4	–	<i>Wait for response.</i>
Step 5	–	On what information do you base your statement?
Step 6	–	<i>Wait for response. From now on DO NOT WAIT</i>
Step 7	–	You see, my information is . . .
Step 8	–	Therefore, in my opinion. . . and. . .
Step 9	–	therefore I would like to suggest.
Step 10	–	Do you agree? if not, why?

Two attempts at research on negotiating strategies and tactics are those of

- (a) Hanner and Yuki (Druckman 1977:137) on the effectiveness of different presentation strategies in negotiation (based on the game theory), identifying a few tactics; and
- (b) Donohue (1981:273-287) who developed three categories of strategies, namely aggressive, defensive and regressing and found that he could predict results according to the strategies that were followed.

More strategies and tactics have been recommended in the literature than an active negotiator could possibly try out in one lifetime. There are strategies and tactics for each negotiating element (such as communication tactics, power tactics, threats, and the compilation of negotiating teams), and they are employed differently in each situation. The strategies and tactics to be chosen depend on the negotiating goal, situations, problems, power base team, and various other aspects. One recipe does not necessarily suffice in all situations.

Figure 26

**KARRASS'S PLANNING TABLE FOR NEGOTIATION**

Strategic planning (policy)	Administrative planning	Tactical planning (operational)
To select and negotiate with source or sources that optimise overall company competitive position and objectives	To organise people, power and informational resources and to optimize negotiation performance	To optimise realisation of negotiation potential
Decide which strategic goals are most important, how much is wanted and how best to achieve major objectives	Organisation, acquisition and development of people, power and informational resources	Determination of sub-goals, persuasive arguments and means appropriate to reaching strategic goals; testing intent of opponent
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Product-market mix</li> <li>● Make or buy mix</li> <li>● Constraints – customer and environment</li> <li>● Decision-making structure</li> <li>● Competition philosophy</li> <li>● Basic goals – technical, price, delivery, management</li> <li>● Trade-offs</li> <li>● Risk-taking and risk identification</li> <li>● Power relationships</li> <li>● Attitude relationships</li> <li>● Fact-finding methods</li> <li>● Proposal and information control (security)</li> <li>● Ethical values</li> <li>● Selection of chief negotiator</li> <li>● Worth-analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Organisation: Team support, and special assistance</li> <li>● Information: Fact-finding, channels, analysis, security and assumption testing</li> <li>● Resources: Personnel, tools, training, facilities, third parties</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sub-goals: Issues, problems, targets, assumption and intent testing</li> <li>● Techniques: Agenda, questions, affirmative statements, concessions, listening, commitments, moves, threats, promises, recess, delays, deadlock, nonverbal communications, focal points and standards</li> <li>● Inoculation</li> <li>● Maneuvres: Timing inspection association, authority, amount, brotherhood, diversion</li> </ul>

A negotiator's chances of identifying strategies and tactics successfully are enhanced by his knowledge of the parties' position and goals, and by his ability to keep record, and to analyse the process.

The authors are unanimous, however, about the necessity to plan strategies and tactics. They must be determined in advance, based on the above mentioned factors and the goals and expectations of the other party. The planning of strategies and tactics should occur during the planning phase, but can be used in each phase of the negotiation. See Karrass's (1970:151) planning table as illustrated in Figure 26.

## **Phases in the negotiating process**

Authors distinguish between different phases in the negotiating process.

Pienaar and Robinson (1983)


They divide negotiation into seven phases, see Figure 27.

During phase 1, the goal setting phase, the agreement that should be reached is decided. During phase 2, the power phase, a party determines his own power and that of the opposition as well as the power positions of both. The third, or power building phase, includes the establishment of pre-negotiating and power building strategies, for example, applying pressure, or the attainment of expert power. If there is disequilibrium or an inequality in power, a strategy must be devised to rectify this. Phase 4 is the dispute identification phase. Here, negotiating issues, the priorities of each, points of exchange or surrender, and problem areas are identified and the final and hidden agenda is drawn up. During the fifth or synthesis phase, the case is prepared and a negotiation team is assembled and trained. These five phases constitute part of the preparation.

The face-to-face negotiation occurs during the sixth phase, the negotiating phase. During this phase, the planning is put to use, personalities are fathomed, the willingness of the other party to change position is determined and one's own willingness is concealed, tactics such as those identified by Bales are employed, non verbal manipulation and persuasion communication are applied, and perception analysed. These are all part of the process of negotiation.

Figure 27

PIENAAR AND ROBINSON'S NEGOTIATING PHASES



The seventh and last phase of negotiation is the verification phase. During this phase, negotiation is concluded, decisions are verified, and the implementation is determined.

Pienaar and Robinson do not distinguish a separate implementation phase.

### Zartman and Berman (1982)

Zartman and Berman (1982:42-202) distinguish five negotiating phases, namely the pre-negotiation phase, a diagnostic phase, a formulation phase, a detail phase, and a structuring phase. They do not make a clear distinction between these phases, nor do they describe how each phase develops.

### Atkinson (1980)

Atkinson (1980:33) distinguishes four negotiating phases and the actions that take place in them for different types of negotiation.

**Figure 28**


#### **ATKINSON'S NEGOTIATING PHASES**

	Phases	Dealing with grievances and bargaining	Advising and problem solving
i	Exploration	Position development	Joint exploration
ii	Expectation structuring	Emphasis on bargaining	Emphasis on discussion
iii	Movement and solution development	Emphasis on bartering and movement	Emphasis on joint solution
iv	Conclusion	Finalisation of agreement	Finalisation of agreement

Atkinson also indicates the degree to which each tactic is used in each phase (p. 34).

Figure 29

**DEGREE OF TACTIC USE IN EACH NEGOTIATING PHASE**



NB: Atkinson defines bargaining as one type of negotiation, which in this study, has been defined as distributive negotiation.

Atkinson does not specify at which stage of the negotiation a particular phase occurs and does not consider planning part of the negotiating process.

## Summary

According to the literature, negotiation therefore consists of phases. These phases are not always clearly distinguishable. Authors differ on the number of phases and their content. It is evident, however, that there are a pre-negotiation or planning phase, a phase in which face-to-face negotiating communication takes place, and a post-negotiating phase in which finalisation and implementation occur.

The negotiating strategy determines *what* takes place in each phase and the tactics determine *how* it takes place. The negotiating process begins with the acknowledgement of conflict or points of difference, and the will to resolve it by means of negotiation. This includes all actions within and outside of direct negotiation that are aimed at reaching an agreement on these differences. The end of the negotiation is heralded when the agreement has been successfully implemented with the approval of both parties.

## NEGOTIATION RELATIONSHIP

An important element that influences negotiation is the formation and maintenance of relationships.

Relationships are formed when interaction occurs between two individuals. In the negotiating situation, relationships are established through the interaction between the participants and influenced by personality, roles, trust, conflict, compromise, and the contract zone.

It is desirable that a sound working relationship emerges between individuals or parties, and within a party in a negotiating situation to ensure successful negotiation. The situation often determines the type of relationship. The relationship also exists as part of the situation – an element which co-influences the negotiation. A negotiating relationship fosters trust, clears

alternative ways for the resolution of conflict, and in this way contributes to the reaching of an agreement.

Individuals approach negotiation with different personalities, roles and role expectations, attitudes, value systems, and goals. When a relationship is formed, it follows that role expectations and attitudes will be influenced. The forming of relationships, encouraged by the mutual recognition of parties and the identification of commonalities can contribute to the negotiating success. Piron (1982:6) expatiates on recognition of negotiating parties in South Africa in his *Recognition or rejection? A primer on recognition in South Africa*. According to Piron the objective of the recognition process is for parties to get to know one another and to form a relationship. He describes the nature of such a relationship as: “. . . a relationship of trust, pure and simple.” He also believes that a relationship is based on training, communication, good administration, and confidence in the other party (p 127).

Atkinson (1980:38) also maintains that a relationship has to be developed purposefully, based on common areas, or aspects on which the parties agree. The more common ground there is, the easier it is to form and maintain a relationship.

A negotiating relationship must be sustained. According to Hamblin and Kunkel (1977:58) this is achieved by reinforcing reciprocal behaviour. Fisher and Ury (1981:11) maintain that this is only possible when communication is focused on the common problem and not on individuals. It can be decided for example that results should be measured against an objective criterion, such as the current market value, rather than accepting the one or other party's solution. Roloff (1981:14) contends, like other social exchange theoreticians, that a relationship between two parties will continue to exist as long as there is reward. This reward can be the promotion of self interest (which needs not necessarily be negative for the negotiation), or the exchange of social approval such as respect, approval and esteem (Hamblin, Kunkel 1977:94). Clarke (1977:59) argues that the nature and survival of a relationship depend on the negotiating strategy (the type of interaction) that is followed.

“It is usually fruitless to try to understand the meaning of a message apart from the significance of relationships” (Mortensen 1973:241). The best insurance for a relationship to form and to survive, so that meaning can be shared, is trust.

## TRUST

Trust is the perception of a person as reliable or trustworthy.

According to Tubbs and Moss (1974:135), trust is “an expectancy . . . that the word, promise, verbal (oral) or written statement of another individual can be relied on.” If someone is perceived as credible, he will instil trust in the perceiver. Trust will be accomplished more easily if a sound relationship exists between the perceiver and the person perceived.

In the negotiating process, trust is essential, at the very least to make the negotiation possible, but especially to reach an agreement. Successful negotiation depends on the successful implementation of the agreement. This requires trust. Zartman and Berman (1982:28) describe trust as a pre-condition for successful negotiation. “I’ve often seen negotiations deadlock because of emotional conflicts and distrust”, says Kenneth Rush, an American ambassador to France.

Unbridled trust however is folly. “Thus, no party can be completely trusting, since he would be at the mercy of the other’s deceptions, and no party can be completely untrustworthy, since he would destroy the possibility of any agreement.” (Zartman, Berman 1982: 28). There should be enough trust to sustain the negotiating process, but not to the degree that a party is led up the garden path.

Trust can be built by a good record which is verifiable among the negotiator’s own as well as other parties.

The importance of sound working relations can never be over emphasised in the building of trust. If there is a good working relationship, and personal credibility is accepted, it is sometimes possible to avoid conflict in negotiation. Caradon, chairman of

Britain's security council delegation to the UN, after days of hard work on Resolution 242, was asked for a few hours postponement by Kuznetsov (USSR's deputy minister for foreign affairs) before presenting this resolution to the security council. If Caradon were to grant this postponement, the Russians could persuade the South American countries of their standpoint and so win the vote. Caradon, however, trusted Kuznetsov, because they have worked together previously. After the period of postponement had expired, Britain brought the issue up for discussion, and it was accepted unanimously. Kuznetsov needed time to sell the UK's case to the Kremlin (Zartman Berman 1982:40-41).

Trust is part of the negotiating process. Nevertheless, it cannot be put to the test until it is possibly too late. The following actions, however, may reinforce trust:

- (a) By showing understanding for the other party's problems, while sticking to your own goals. Trust cannot be built by threats or wild promises.
- (b) By a step-by-step fulfilment of agreements (compare the way in which Kissinger dealt with the Middle East issues).
- (c) By "free offers" such as in the case of Sadat, who went to Israel in November 1977?
- (d) If the other party accepts the action that has been offered, and if a party can be persuaded that an action is to his advantage. Beware of trading definite economic, political or military goods when there is no reciprocity.
- (e) Increasing interdependency, for example, the awareness that both parties are losing in a war.
- (f) When the negotiation yields some result early on, for example the Israeli journalists who were allowed into Egypt.

In the process of establishing trust, personal trust may emerge, which may help members to sell their own and other parties' proposals at home. An example of this is the work group

regarding the concept proposals of the NATO negotiations (see Achilles's discourse in Zartman, Berman 1982:38).

## **Summary**

It is easy to develop trust in a sound negotiating relationship. If trust exists, it is possible to resolve the conflict that led to a need for negotiation, and conflict that arises from the negotiating process. It is also easier to grant concessions, and to reach a compromise, if there is trust between parties.

## **CONFLICT, COMPROMISE AND CONCESSIONS**

“Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce rewards, and interference from the other parties in achieving their goals” (Frost, Wilmot 1978:9).

Conflict therefore occurs where:

- (a) at least two parties are interacting;
- (b) their goals and values are mutually exclusive, or are perceived as such;
- (c) their interaction is aimed at beating, humiliating or subjugating an opponent, or at joint solutions;
- (d) the parties confront each other with opposing actions and counter actions; and
- (e) each attempts to bring about disequilibrium for the other, or an advantageous power position for himself.

## **NATURE, TYPES AND SOURCES**

Conflict, according to Robinson (1977:195), can be divided into two broad methods of approach: the pathological and behavioristic approach. According to the pathological approach, conflict is bad and a cure should be found. In contrast, the

behavioristic approach considers conflict an inevitable aspect of negotiation and does not attempt resolution, but sees the objective as control or utilisation of the conflict. Cavanaugh (1983) calls it “creative conflict” and describes this perception as follows in the *New Angles* section of *The Winning Negotiator* of 15th July 1983: “In many cases, conflict is inevitable and even desirable. It is important to recognise the presence of a certain level of conflict in negotiation as positive and not as something to automatically suppress.”

De Swardt (1979:33) maintains that inherent in any social being or groups’s repertoire of actions there is a combination of elements of co-operation and conflict. Thus we find conflict within and between groups in negotiation. Filley (1975) is also of the opinion that conflict, as such, is not bad, but that the consequences depend on how it is perceived and on the actions which arise from it: “. . . conflict is a process which itself is neither good nor bad, but which has elements and outcomes which may be judged favourably or unfavourably by those participating in or evaluating it” (p 7).

The advantages of conflict are, inter alia,

- (a) the defusing of more serious conflict, for example, by means of systems to air grievances;
- (b) the stimulation of new facts and solutions, for example, from a confrontation between trade unions and management;
- (c) an increase in group cohesion and behaviour; and
- (d) it can be a measurement of power.

Filley (1975:2-3) distinguishes four types of conflict, namely competitive conflict, disruptive conflict, differences, and problem solving.

### Competitive conflict

In this type of conflict the resources are scarce, or are perceived as being such, while the parties have corresponding interests. One party’s gain means the other’s loss.

Both parties strive towards incompatible goals and are focussed on victory, but not on annihilation. Actions are aimed at winning, and the competition ceases when both acknowledge the results.

### Disruptive conflict

Here the resources are scarce and the interests are different. The parties have not concurred on a set of ground rules for negotiation on the conflict, and actions are not always rational. The goal is not to win, but to harm, vanquish, or drive out an opponent. The atmosphere is fraught with anxiety, tension, and fear.

### Differences

When there are, or there are perceived to be, sufficient resources and the interests of the parties differ, this type of conflict or debate occurs.

### Problem solving

If sufficient resources are available, and the parties' interests concur, it is possible to resolve the conflict. The objective here is to obtain the most acceptable result that would allow both parties the greatest possible benefit or gain. During this process, the skill and knowledge of both parties are improved by a constant striving for interaction that would benefit both.

According to Filley, conflict therefore involves incompatible goals and different values. These differences can however be perceived as real. If the parties can change their perception of scarce resources to sufficient resources, and if they would recognise common interests, it is possible to resolve conflict.


### **The conflict process**

Before the methods for resolving conflict can be discussed, the process itself should be examined.

The conflict process between two parties is visualised as follows by Filley (1975:8):

**Figure 30**

**THE CONFLICT PROCESS**



The process consists of six steps, namely:

**Antecedent conditions**

These conditions are features of the situation that may lead to conflict, although the conditions may exist without conflict. Conditions include ambiguous jurisdiction, conflict of interests, communication barriers, excessive dependency of one of the

parties, differentiation in an organisation, association of parties, a need for consensus, behaviour regulations, or unresolved previous conflicts.

### Perceived conflict

Perceived conflict is a set of conditions perceived to be conflicting for the parties.

### Felt or experienced conflict

This is a personalised, incompatible relationship that finds expression in threats, animosity, fear and suspicion.

### Manifest behaviour

Manifest behaviour is the perceptible action that follows conflict, namely aggression, competition, debating or problem solving.

### Conflict resolution or suppression

This step follows the actions and brings an end to the conflict when an agreement is reached among all parties, or when one party is victorious.

### The aftermath

After the resolution follows the aftermath, or the consequences of the conflict.

If the conflict process is considered part of human interaction (therefore also of negotiation), methods for resolving conflict should be examined.

Cavanaugh (1983:7) recommends that, apart from specific methods, conditions and a general atmosphere of conciliation should be created: “. . . not in a negative sense by abusiveness

or telling people off, but by creating the conditions which allow the intimidator to reflect upon, examine, question or change some aspects of his or her behaviour.”

## **Methods of conflict resolution**

Filley (1975:22-28) and Adler and Rodman (1982:192) discuss three methods of conflict resolution, namely win-lose, lose-lose and win-win.

### **Win-lose methods**

A typical example of these methods is the use of authority or mental or physical power. Failing to react is also a method of win-lose, and so is the use of a majority or minority government (by a chairman or through pressure).

### **Lose-lose methods**

A compromise, where neither party really achieves his goal, is a form of the lose-lose method. A compromise however is sometimes required, to arrive at a solution for a problem. Payments on the sly, bribes to fake losing also in fact constitute a loss for both parties. A neutral third party who becomes involved as mediator or arbitrator also seldom leads to a satisfactory resolution. Referring to rules in order to avoid a confrontation also leads to lose-lose results.

In the above mentioned methods there is a difference in perception and in goals among the parties. These methods are the most prevalent, although the third method offers the best and most lasting resolution.

### **Win-win methods**

Two types of strategies are found among these methods, namely consensus and integrative decision taking. In both of these, the focus is on the goals rather than on the differences (see Fisher

and Ury's (1981:41) Principle Negotiating Method and Devito's (1978:293) approach).

### *Consensus*

As with compromise, consensus also leads to a resolution which is not really acceptable to either party, but it is often employed to arrive at some agreement. Thousands of soldiers had to die in Vietnam, for example, before Hanoi or Washington decided to grant the first concession regarding the location for the peace negotiation – Warschau or Honolulu.

Both parties have to focus on the problem. Consensus does not include voting, an exchange, or an average, but focuses on behaviour that is not self directed. This method includes concessions. Concessions involve an adjustment of position until an agreement is reached. Beaumont (1980: 116) even describes negotiation as a process of concessions.


### *Integrative decision taking*

The difference between this win-win method and concessions is not a difference in type but a difference in degree. Integrative decision taking is not as much a choice of alternatives as a series of steps. The “zero-sum” conditions are changed to a positive gain for both parties. Clarke (1977:1) maintains that an “. . . exploration of mutually profitable adjustments and gains for one party does not mean losses for the other party.” The resolution must therefore be acceptable to both parties. One of the parties will have to put a high premium on quality and a low premium on acceptance and the other party just the reverse, while “fairness” and “equality” will have to be important. The process of decision taking should be controlled, but not its content. All the parties must accept that it is important to be open and honest with facts, opinions and feelings.

According to Filley (1975:94) the steps for integrative decision taking method are as follows:

Figure 31

FILLEY'S METHOD OF INTEGRATIVE DECISION-MAKING



**Summary**

Potential conflict areas should be identified in advance, and plans to counter unforeseen events should be at the ready to

prevent or diminish disruption. Methods to resolve conflict and to maximise gain for both parties should be provided and improved. According to De Vito (1978:292), effective communication principles and channels help to resolve conflict.

## **COMMON GROUND**

For successful negotiation, it is necessary that, in spite of conflict, an agreement should in fact be reached. The most effective way of reaching an agreement as soon as possible is the establishment of common ground.

Common points, viewpoints or ground are seldom known. The onus is on the negotiator to identify these points or areas. This can be done by establishing the opponent's negotiation base or position and his aspirational base.

If there is no awareness of common ground on which a contract may be based, a strategy has to be devised whereby fundamental points of agreement (a precondition for negotiation) can be used to establish common ground.


Although the negotiating and aspirational bases of the parties concerned will not Concur, some overlapping has to be found. It is in this area, the contract zone, where negotiation can take place and a mutually acceptable resolution may be found.

A diagrammatic representation of the contract zone, a variation of Robinson's (1977:200) contract negotiating model, is illustrated in Figure 32.

The ability of a party to obtain information about the other party's position, and to persuade him to agree to mutually favourable proposals, depend on his ability to employ negotiating techniques such as the questions technique. The information enables the party to direct the negotiation towards a successful agreement.

Figure 32

THE CONTRACT ZONE



COALITION FORMING

A coalition consists of two or more people or parties who work together to achieve a common goal.

From the literature that has been studied it is evident that parties co-operate predominantly to obtain power over others, or to increase their power.

Thibaut and Kelley (1959:205) describe the objective of coalition as “. . . co-operation amongst individual to the end of exercising control over others,” while Rubin and Brown (1975:64) see coalition as “. . . the unification of the power or resources (or both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better chance of obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others not included in the coalition.”

If the assumption is made therefore, that there is a difference in power and resources (real or perceived) in a multi-party negotiating relationship, and that it is usually to the advantage of a party to utilise these resources to achieve a specific result, then one could expect that coalitions would be formed as a mechanism to eliminate weaknesses under such conditions. Coalition forming is therefore a primary process in negotiation.

## Reasons for coalition forming

Coalitions are usually formed when the self perception of a party's weak points, disadvantages, or insufficient resources required to affect a certain result, compels two or more parties to combine forces in order to maintain or reinforce their individual power, so that they will not be perceived or treated as weak by other parties in the negotiation.

Caplow conducted research in 1956 on the reasons why parties form coalitions. His premise is that the distribution of relative power is the biggest determinant of coalition formation. His predictions were based on three propositions, namely:

- (a) that power discrepancies in competitive situations leave individuals with no alternative but to form coalitions to prevent other parties from obtaining control over them;
- (b) that the weaker parties will be inclined to form coalitions against the stronger parties; and
- (c) that the processes of coalition formation in triads are also valid for more parties.

## Conditions under which coalitions are formed

There are certain conditions which foster the forming of coalitions. When power or other necessary resources are divided, or perceived as divided, in such a way that a party sees himself thwarted in the possibility of obtaining a result and that it would be advantageous to join forces with others to achieve the result, coalitions will be formed.

Studies conducted by Vinacke and Arkoff (1957), Bond and Vinacke (1961), Uesugi and Vinacke (1963), Vinacke (1959), Shears (1967), and Gamson (1962) demonstrate that power is not necessarily good. The perception of weakness or vulnerability may motivate parties towards coalition. They also found that women form different types of coalitions than men.

Other conditions that lead to coalition forming include the perception of a party as a common enemy, and when a party interferes when two parties are already in conflict.

Conditions under which coalitions will not be formed are when:

- (a) this will not obtain any results;
- (b) parties are actively restrained from it by stronger parties, or management;
- (c) other differences or conflict exist between potential parties.

### **Factors which influence the desirability of a coalition partner**

Such factors are inter alia the relative power of the other party, the status, skills and potential which the other party has for success, and the fulfilment of previous coalition agreements.

A possible coalition which could have been formed for the 1984 American presidential election was that between the Democratic party (with Mondale) and black organisations such as the People United to Serve Humanity (of Jesse Jackson), or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (established by Martin Luther King). If preliminary surveys had shown that Jesse Jackson would not get enough black Americans to register so that he could be a contender in his own right, or if the Democratic candidate had felt that he would not be able to defeat the president, they probably would have formed a coalition. With the new votes that Jackson could have gained in his campaign (estimated at 1 million before end of August 1983) and the better distribution of white votes that the Democrats could have had (Time 22 (8), 22nd August 1983: 38-48), it would have helped both parties to achieve a greater input in policy matters, had they formed a coalition.

### **Conclusion**

If coalition formation cannot be employed, and even in the event of such an action, parties can try to use bluff, threats, manipulation or force.

# BLUFF, THREATS, COERCION AND MANIPULATION

## Bluff

Bluff is the tactic whereby a misleading impression is created through boasting. It is therefore a manipulation of the real information, for example to create the impression that you have nuclear weapon potential, while it is not the case.

Bluff can also include the hierarchy or priority of values. A party can say for instance that they prefer one result, but are willing to compromise by accepting another result, while in fact they did indeed want the last result.

Bluff may also involve the degree of a party's commitment: for example, aid may be promised, while it can, or will not be offered.

The success of bluff as technique is vested in its credibility to the party concerned. The accuracy of bluff information may be tested by an examination of the communicated information or values (Zartman, Berman 1982: 158).

## Threats

A threat may be defined as the explicit intention to behave in such a way that it is perceived as detrimental to the interests of the other party.

The aim with threats is to transmit information about the negotiator's preferences and intentions. If, therefore, threats occur during the early stage or opening movements of a negotiation, they may lead to mutual suspicion and competition (Rubin, Brown 1975:263). By monitoring the other party's tempo, frequency and intensity of threats or promises, his real intentions and preferences may be determined.

Threats also reveal information about how the party who utters them perceives the other party. If the other party's attitude is perceived as negative, a threat, rather than a positive reaction will

be delivered. Raven and Kruglanski (1970), however, indicate that threats that are too weak cause the threatened party to feel insulted about his own power.

A promise differs from a threat in that it is the expressed intention to act in such a way as to favour the other party. When a promise is uttered, it expresses a positive attitude towards, and perception of, the other party.

Threats are also used as a tactic of power building. Karrass (1970:55-56) calls to mind the example of the warning by the seventy three year old Czechoslovakian president, Luchvik Svoboda, to the communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, in his office on 23rd August 1969, to release the Czech leaders. Svoboda threatened to kill himself in Brezhnev's office, if he should not release the leaders. Nobody, Svoboda argued quite rightly, would believe that he was not killed by Brezhnev. The threat worked.

Druckman (1973:30) warns, however, that threats do not diminish conflict in general. Robinson (1977:213) maintains that they are more successful when they have the desired effect, but do not have to be carried out. This thin line between threats and implementation is called the game of "chicken" or brinkmanship.

T.C. Schellings classic example of "chicken", or who concedes first is:

"When two dynamite trucks meet on a road wide enough for one, who backs up?"

Talbot (1983:28) gives a well known example of brinkmanship. John F. Kennedy threatened in 1962 to keep the precursors of Pershing II in Europe, if Nikita Khrushchev did not remove the forerunners of the SS-20 missiles from Cuba. It was in any event the intention of the USA to remove their missiles from Europe for military and political reasons, but Khrushchev did not know this. Thus, he found the threat feasible, and the Soviet ships returned home with the missiles on board. This event, however, was not the end of this conflict and is, in the words of Andrei Gromyko's

deputy minister, Vasily Kuznetsov, the reason for the Soviet Union's power build up during the past 20 years, of which the SS-20 missile program is the most dangerous manifestation. A symbolic replay of the Cuban missile incident is not out of the question, according to Talbot.

These are some of the questions regarding threats that still have to be researched and about which there has not yet been final agreement:

- (a) When is a negotiator inclined to use threats?
- (b) What use do threats have, except as influence?
- (c) How can threats be used to improve the effectiveness of the negotiation, without causing the other party to be negative?

## **Coercion**

If threats are carried out, or if a person is forced to do something against his will, coercion comes into play. Force or coercion however should be distinguished from tactics such as influence or persuasion, where a party is indeed persuaded to change his standpoint, but voluntarily, not against his will. Although persuasion may therefore be acceptable and successful, "persuasive speaking is essential because it is the key to problem solving in democracy" (Adler, Rodman 1982: 370), coercion is not acceptable and often not successful. Even though an agreement may be reached as a result of coercion, the long term relationship will suffer, and the decisions might not necessarily be implemented.

Coercion can also lead to violence. Gulliver (1979:1) identifies five categories of problem solving. The most general and most universal of these, according to Gulliver, is negotiation and adjudication or arbitration. The most dangerous is violent self help such as strikes, attacks, or war. Violence usually does not solve the problem, but escalates it.

## Manipulation

Manipulation is the agitation and sometimes threatening of people to achieve a goal. In this way, the party's expectations, behaviour structure, and perception may be manipulated. This is usually accomplished through the information that is communicated (Young 1975:303).

Manipulation does have negative connotations, but nevertheless is used by most negotiators to achieve their goal. If both parties accept the agreement, manipulation is probably justified. If, however, it is used to make a party change his standpoint against his will, such a party needs to defend himself. Fisher and Ury (1981:134-137) suggest various counter mechanisms:

- (a) recognise the technique that is employed against you;
- (b) name it;
- (c) question the fairness and acceptability of the technique; and
- (d) if this does not succeed, leave.

Possible techniques that may be applied include intentional deceit, psychological warfare, and positional pressure. According to Fisher and Ury, a party should not sit by and be a willing victim, he must take positive steps against it and debunk the other team if needs be.

## Summary

Bluff, threats, coercion and manipulation do occur in negotiations, but their effectiveness and desirability have not yet been empirically determined.

## SITUATION

The negotiating situation includes all aspects which are not explicitly part of the process itself and the elements, but which influence them. These are the physical and psychological environment, time, and culture.

Culture has already been discussed and the physical and psychological environments have been touched upon in the discussion of elements such as personality, communication channels, and non verbal communication. This section will therefore deal with time as negotiating element.

## Time

The length, tempo, and position of time influence the negotiating process. Time affects each phase of the negotiating process, as well as the strategies and tactics that are employed in each phase.

Time should be taken into account as early as the planning phase. Pienaar and Robinson (1983:31-32) recommend that a time schedule that is relevant to the whole negotiating process should be drawn up during the planning phase. The entire time scale should be divided into four time units and each time unit into two content units, as represented by Figure 33.

There are eight time content units. After the completion of each unit, except the first and last, it is necessary to make progressive summaries of the negotiating events.

Pienaar points out that this format is planned according to the principles of group formation (see p. 94). During cell A and B, parties get to know one another, and common ground is established. Cells C to G are the work phases, which begin with a definition of the problem. Thereafter, issues are discussed one by one, concessions are granted and received, and this time unit concludes with a settlement of the negotiation and the formulation of a "contract." G is an important time unit during which the implementation of the "contract" is determined. The final stage is once more a socio-emotional phase, during which pleasantries are exchanged. The length of each phase should be planned and carefully controlled.

Figure 33

TIME SCHEDULE FOR NEGOTIATING PROCESS

Content units	Time units			
	1	2	3	4
1	A Opening (Socio-emotional phase)	C Problem defining phase	E Exchange	G Implementation
	PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY			
2	B Common ground	D Exchange	F Agreement Security Formulation	H Conclusion (Socio-emotional phase)
	PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY			

Karrass (1970:205-207) confirms the advantages of careful time planning. He mentions the example of an aeronautical engineer who, as a result of sound time planning and strict control, was able to fulfil contracts that eventually afforded him special negotiating power in the business.

Time as power tactic

Time is a source of power. Events that control time in negotiation may be actual or unreal, as long as they are perceived to be credible. Patience is also power. The party with the least patience places a power base into the hands of the opposition.

Karrass (1970:173-174) identifies seven time related movements that could be utilised as negotiating tactics.

### *Patience*

Acquiescence and the maturity to live with a situation for the sake of greater gain in the future are important in negotiation. Most people have a strong desire to end the tension of negotiation as soon as possible. This does not necessarily lead to good results.

### *Protraction*

This is a special form of patience. In this case a party takes the conscious decision to protract the negotiation for as long as possible, until certain known or unknown aspects reveal themselves, before the final agreement. Such a negotiation should only be entered into after a rational consideration of its implications.

### *Deadline*

The use of a deadline is a powerful tactic in negotiation, as it carries the potential for real loss to both parties. Last minute negotiation occurs so frequently, that it has been said by Dunlop and Jealy (1955) to be a fundamental feature of the collective bargaining process. The cost of possible work strikes is considerable, which place these last minute decisions under great pressure (Young 1975:137).

Time restrictions in negotiation can be implicit or explicit, self generated or applied from the outside, flexible (as in the case of the SALT negotiations) or rigid, and may be seen in the same way or differently by parties. They can also be advantageous, for example, a “cool down” period, or to obtain concessions. Time restrictions or time pressure, however, have significant implications, as they heighten the possibility of acquiescence against a party’s wishes and diminished aspirations. The demands and degree of bluffing also contribute to this possibility.

### *Speed*

Shorter negotiations cost less money.

### *Surprise*

Speedy action catches the other party on the wrong foot and provides a considerable advantage.

### *Status quo*

Static and unchanged conditions can sometimes be advantageous to a party.

### *Fait accompli*

The fait accompli tactic is relatively unknown to business men but well known to diplomats. Argentina's occupation of the Falklands placed them in a strong negotiating position. Without the occupation, Britain would not have acknowledged them as negotiating party. They made use of the fait accompli tactic. Once certain things have been done, they may become important realities of negotiating power, whether they are legal or not. The expression, "possession is nine-tenths of the law", illustrates this use of time.

### Research requirements

Rubin and Brown (1975:293) indicate that the following problems of time utilisation in negotiation still need to be researched:

- (a) Under which circumstances do time restrictions lead to effective negotiation, thus better decision taking?
- (b) When is the opposite true?
- (c) Which type of negotiator is more susceptible to time pressure?
- (d) Can the introduction of a deadline by a third party increase the effectiveness of negotiation?
- (e) At which stage of the negotiation will negotiators accept intervention?
- (f) How can time restrictions be exploited for strategic advantage?

## RESULTS AND IMPLEMENTATION

### Results

Negotiating results are difficult to determine and are often only visible long after the conclusion of the process. There are also innumerable variables in a negotiation, which complicate effective measuring even more than the problems that are in any event encountered in the establishment of causal relations.

Two questions that particularly highlight the problems of measuring negotiating results, are:

- (a) from whose viewpoint should the results be considered: from that of party A, or B, or C, or from an interested third party's; and
- (b) when is the negotiation successful: when an agreement has been reached, party A has achieved his goals, or party B?

In the literature, there are references to the results of negotiations, but not to how they are measured, or to what they should be compared.

The results obtained by parties are not independent, but have mutual influence on each other (Sawyer, Guetskow 1965:466). Each party, even if only partially, is dependent on the other party for the quality of the results that they receive. Rubin and Brown (1975:10) maintain that the result of each party is predominantly, or wholly, dependent on that of the other party(ies). This approach, however, implies closed resource allocation, or a zero-sum viewpoint that does not provide for multi party, multi-issues negotiation that are normally the rule.

The degree to which interdependency does exist, complicates the measurement of results.

The attainment of acceptable results is not only a problem for the researcher, but also for the negotiator in practice. This aim places a party in, what Kelley (1966) calls a, "dilemma of goals." Each party desires to reach an agreement that brings him as near

as possible to his aspiration level. The party should therefore design his strategy in such a way that his actions are not so tough that the other party is daunted or dissatisfied, but neither should he aspire too low and only gain insignificantly. Each party must therefore decide right from the start what is the minimum solution that he will accept.

## **IMPLEMENTATION**

No negotiation has been completed successfully until the agreement has been implemented. Both parties must be satisfied with the results or agreement. If one party applies good manipulation techniques, which cause the other party to enter into an agreement with which they are unhappy, the possibility exists that implementation will not take place.

During the planning and negotiating phase, it is necessary to ensure as far as possible that implementation will indeed take place. Specific deadlines and possibly more than one, must be arranged, and also the penalties if they are not met. An important aspect that contributes to the fulfilment of the implementation of results, consists of “face-saving” and “face restoration” (Karrass 1974:64-66). A person or party whose ego or integrity has been injured, will be willing to suffer losses (even allow the negotiation to fail) so that the other party who sullied his esteem may also suffer damages. It is essential to sort out misunderstandings in order to restore communication and to ensure the implementation of the results.

The arrangements for the implementation of the negotiation should be finalised and ironed out in detail during the concluding phase of the negotiation.

# 6

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## Training in negotiation

In the previous chapters, the concepts relevant to negotiation, the theories and models on negotiation, the research methods used to generate information on negotiation, and an overview and integration of the knowledge available on negotiation were discussed. It now remains to establish to what extent the available theory (including the concepts) and the knowledge of negotiation as a result of research, is utilised in negotiation training programmes.

In this chapter, the points covered in negotiation training literature and courses, the extent to which they are based on research, and the areas that still need attention, will be discussed.

The discussion is based on training materials and courses reviewed and attended on a continued basis since 1983 as part of the activities of the Programme on Negotiation of the Institute for Communication Research of the Human Sciences Research Council. It includes training material and programmes by prominent negotiation trainers in South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom (for example by Atkinson (1980), Contact Group (1987), Cohen (1980), Fisher and Ury (1981), Karrass (1970, 1974), Pienaar and Robinson (1983), Levin (1980), Nierenberg (1973), Raiffa (1982), Susskind and Bazerman (1985), and Warschaw (1980)). The discussion will be

in the form of a summary and a comparison, as a detailed discussion of each training programme does not fall within the scope of this work.

## NEGOTIATION ASPECTS COVERED BY TRAINING MATERIALS AND COURSES

The various training materials that are available, emphasise different areas, vary in style of presentation and in the quality of argument. The content of all the courses is, however, successful negotiation, and the *process* – not the structure or the content – is mostly seen as the reason for the result or outcome. Negotiation is therefore seen as having identifiable elements that are interdependent, distinguishable from other forms of human interaction, and functioning as a whole.

According to the instructors, a negotiator should master a certain set of skills to be successful. The skills recommended by the instructors will be summarised according to Weiss-Wik's (1983:715-717) behaviour guidelines. It should be noted that the instructors consider the skills *learnable* and the behaviour or *action* of the individual negotiator crucial to the successful execution of the negotiation. Some of the guidelines are enacted sequentially, while others need to be heeded simultaneously (as indicated by a \*).

**A win-win attitude.** Win-win is an attitude towards negotiation – reflected in the negotiation strategy adopted – that each party should gain the best possible result, instead of deceiving each other as much as possible. Fisher and Ury (1981) are the main advocates of this attitude. They define it as a wise agreement and stipulate the efficient proceedings in their method of Principled Negotiation. The other instructors also support this outlook, on the basis that the results are more likely to be implemented. It can also enhance the working relationship between the participants, and according to Levin (1980), minimises the opponent's desire for retaliation because he was deceived.

**Prepare for the negotiation.** Advance planning for any negotiator in any situation is deemed important by the instructors. The facts of the situation should be studied, the objectives set, the priorities established and the plan of action decided upon. Raiffa (1982: 126) mentions matters such as the negotiator's expectations regarding his counterparts' objectives and strategies, the options he will develop, his back-up positions, bottom lines (see also Fisher and Ury's (1981) BATNA), common ground, and trade-offs, considering possible tactics, and sketching alternative plans. Both Levin (1980) and Warschaw (1980) recommend rehearsing.

\* **Concentrating on the needs and interests.** During the preparation for the negotiation, one's own needs and those of the opponent(s) emerge. These needs are varied and should be addressed when setting the goals and during the face-to-face interaction. If the focus is on the positions taken by the opponent, it is easy to reach a deadlock situation, because viable alternatives do not seem to emerge. If, however, the focus falls on discovering the interests behind the positions (as Fisher and Ury put it), or on the needs of the participants, it seems easier to find an alternative solution to manage the conflict.

\* **Estimating sources of power and implementing tactics.** In terms of a win-win attitude, persuasion – the capacity to influence the other's behaviour – is crucial in gaining the necessary co-operation to fulfill each party's needs. Power is inextricably tied to perception (Levin and Cohen). Depending on the perceived power, the tactics that may be employed cover a broad range: over 100 ranging from Warschaw's temporary situation based tactics to Levin's dirty tactics, Nierenberg's "how and where", and Karrass' summary of tactics and counter tactics. Everyone of the instructors urges negotiators to recognise the use of tactics and to have a knowledge of when and how to use which tactics. Each negotiator is a user and a target of the practice of power. In the final analysis, to be successful, one should be willing to test the other's power.

**Effective communication.** Communication is the medium for negotiation. By means of communication, information is

exchanged about the interests and needs of the negotiators and their priorities. Misunderstandings can also happen through communication, inhibiting the possibility of reaching an agreement. As a communicator, the negotiator should strive to formulate his needs clearly and specifically (Warschaw 1980:171) and use questions effectively to gain information that will help him to achieve his objectives (Nierenberg 1973:109). As a receiver, the negotiator critically perceives non-verbal and verbal cues, is on the look-out for latent intentions, and checks the opponent's perception of his message to minimise misunderstandings.

\* **Monitoring the other negotiator's behaviour.** The behaviour of the team members, and even more so, of the opponent, should influence the negotiator's communication and choice of tactics. Warschaw, for example, identifies six and Levin twelve types of opponents, while Atkinson provides a checklist to establish the type of opponent one has to deal with. The negotiator should be constantly aware of the opponent's characteristics and way of behaviour, and the effect on the negotiation process (therefore also the outcome). Signs of "psychological warfare" or manipulation should be recognised.

\* **Demonstrating flexibility.** A successful negotiator adopts and conveys a win-win attitude. A striving towards problem-solving must be perceived in his words or actions. Trust is very important, but it is more often absent than present. Trust can be built by one's behaviour and by adapting one's objectives and tactics if they are inappropriate (Warschaw calls this midcourse corrections). The willingness and ability to be flexible are crucial to successful negotiation.

\* **Finalisation and implementation of the agreement.** At the right time during the negotiation, when a satisfactory agreement has been reached, the agreement should be written out clearly, explicitly, and preferably in one's own words (Levin (1980:88) and Cohen (1980:220) recommend that one offers to do it). It is essential that the successful negotiator minimizes misunderstandings and that the agreement is of such a nature that it encourages commitment and implementation.

The guidelines given in the materials and courses that were mentioned, should enhance the negotiators' success and heighten an awareness of the negotiation process as a whole.

## **THE NATURE OF SUPPORT BY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH**

The training material and courses covered here, differ little from the general state of negotiation theory. The instructors make certain statements or prescriptions about successful negotiation behaviour which they illustrate with examples from negotiation situations. The statements, however, are seldom based on research, and only one programme has been evaluated once. There is an abundance of available research (as reported in Chapters four and five). It need not be necessary, therefore, for instructors to use examples and anecdotes as if they were scientific facts. Some trainers use the work of researchers, but do not cite the source.

Researchers often complain that they do not have negotiators to participate in their studies. The training programmes seem to present an excellent opportunity of overcoming this problem, while the results of the research can then be used in the courses.

If instructors take note of available research to emphasise their views, and researchers develop research designs that add to the knowledge useful to instructors, this co-operation could result in high quality training programmes and applicable of research.

## **NEGOTIATION AREAS THAT STILL NEED ATTENTION**

The discussions on negotiation theory, research, and training, covered in previous chapters, indicate some areas in the field that still need attention. The most pertinent of these areas will be addressed here.

In an effort to understand negotiation and negotiators' behaviour, theorists, researchers and instructors are purposefully or subconsciously relying on rational behaviour. Recent negotiation literature indicates disillusionment with this perception (Gribben 1983; Weiss-Wik 1983; Nieuwmeijer 1988b). In South Africa in particular, negotiators who now have to start negotiating with traditional black negotiators are experiencing tremendous difficulty in negotiating outside all basic ground rules that were established in Western style negotiations – not that all Western negotiators adhere to “rational” behaviour. It is therefore useless to obtain results on negotiation based on unreal behaviour or situations, or to try and train negotiators to cope in real life situations on the basis of such knowledge.

A related problem that was also mentioned in the introduction to this work involves the differences in concept definitions and perspectives on negotiation. Is it possible to understand negotiation if perceived from so many viewpoints? Is it possible to integrate all the different ways in which negotiation is seen? And if negotiation is theoretically so complex, is it possible for a negotiator to attend to the process in general, and all the various elements that influence the process, and subsequently, his behaviour and the result of the negotiation?

While it is difficult to imagine a negotiator being able to negotiate successfully by mastering all the aspects that are known, it is even more of a problem when one realises how many areas still need to be researched, for example, intercultural factors influencing negotiations, style of verbal expression, many aspects of planning, information gathering, and indeed negotiation research and training.

Negotiators, however, go on negotiating successfully everyday despite the apparent lack of knowledge of the negotiation process and how it functions. But maybe this knowledge will enable them to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement in the cases where they have failed. The knowledge seems to be worth having when one looks at the amount of time and money spent on finding answers.

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